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The United States safety net has undergone significant changes over the last 
three decades. In the early 1990s the Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded. The 
1996 welfare law dramatically reduced access to cash assistance. SNAP (formerly 
food stamps) declined in the aftermath of the 1996 welfare law but rebounded during 
the 2000s. This dissertation analyzes how these safety net changes have affected the 
employment trends of single mothers and the income trends of families with children. 
The first essay examines different ways of measuring how cash assistance 
changed after the 1996 law. It reviews previous approaches and introduces two 
measures that meet the objectives of capturing the benefit level and accessibility of a 
safety net program independent of economic conditions and allowing for variation by 
year, state, and family size. The essay concludes by discussing how this methodology 
can be adapted to measure changes in SNAP and EITC policies. 
 
 
The second essay examines the employment trends of single mothers. The 
descriptive analysis shows how single mothers with the least educational attainment 
and those with the youngest children increased their employment the most between 
1992 and 1999. The econometric analysis uses the safety net measures developed in 
the first essay to analyze the effect of safety net changes on the employment of single 
mothers. It finds that the EITC accounted for 36 percent of the employment increase 
among single mothers with a high school education or less between 1992 and 1999. 
The economy accounted for 20 percent, changes in cash assistance for 10 percent, and 
SNAP changes for 4 percent. 
The third essay examines how the level and composition of incomes of 
families with children changed between 1993 and 2012. These data show how the 
safety net has become more focused on supporting families with earnings and less 
helpful to families during periods of joblessness. Changes in the safety net drove a 16 
percent decline in post-tax post-transfer family income of the poorest five percent of 
children between 1995 and 2005. The paper concludes by looking at the 
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Chapter 1: Measuring the Reach of the Safety Net Before 





The 1996 welfare law eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program and replaced it with a block grant program called 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The law ended the entitlement of 
poor families to assistance from the federal government, instituted a five-year time 
limit on federal cash benefits, imposed stronger work requirements on recipients and 
devolved most details of welfare policy making to the fifty states. The goal of these 
changes was to move single mothers with children who had been receiving AFDC out 
of "dependency" on government assistance and into work outside the home. The law 
aimed to reduce TANF caseloads, increase work participation, reduce poverty, and 
promote marriage. Under TANF states were given a significant amount of flexibility 
in how to design their TANF programs. States have significant flexibility in their 
choice of benefit levels, entry and work participation requirements, sanctions, time 
limits, family caps, earning disregards, exemptions, and other policies.  
States were also given a lot of flexibility in how to spend their TANF block 
grant. When TANF began, 70 percent of TANF funds were used for cash assistance 
to families. Over time, states shifted TANF funds for other purposes such as child 
care, child welfare, and other services. In some cases, this was not new spending, but 
replacing state dollars previously used for those purposes. By 2014, only 26 percent 
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of combined federal and state TANF funds were used for cash assistance (Schott, 
Pavetti and Floyd 2015).  
Policy makers have a keen interest in understanding the impact of the 1996 
welfare reform law on a range of outcomes such as employment and poverty levels. 
One of the most common approaches scholars have used to answer these questions is 
to construct econometric analyses that take advantage of variation of welfare policies 
across time and by state in order to try to isolate the impact of such policies. 
Choosing how to parameterize welfare policies is one of the most important decisions 
in any such analysis. This paper will provide an overview of how various scholars 
have measured welfare reform policies, will provide a framework of how we should 
evaluate these various approaches, and it will propose some new measures. In 
addition, the paper will look at the issue more broadly beyond welfare reform and 
investigate different ways of measuring the reach of other safety net programs such as 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and SNAP (formerly, food stamps).  
1.2 Overview of Previous Approaches 
 
A couple of very thorough summaries of the welfare reform literature exist. 
Rebecca Blank wrote a review of the literature in 2002 and in 2009. Jeffrey Grogger 
and Lynn A. Karoly did a synthesis of the literature in 2002 and a meta-analysis in 
2005. In total, these four publications reviewed over 70 econometric studies that 
aimed to establish a causal link between welfare policy reforms and various outcome 
variables such as welfare use, employment, and income levels. In this section, I draw 
heavily from the work of Grogger and Karoly (2005) since they included as part of 
3 
 
their meta-analysis a detailed discussion of how researchers characterized state-by-
state welfare policies.  
One of the most common approaches taken by researchers is to measure 
policy changes based on when a specific policy was implemented. The analyst codes 
a dummy variable that is equal to one after the policy was implemented and zero 
beforehand. That dummy variable is then included in the regression model, usually 
within a state and year fixed effects framework. The coefficient attached to such a 
variable indicates how much the outcome changed in the states that implemented that 
policy once that policy was implemented. Some studies analyzed welfare reform 
policies “as a bundle” and some analyzed specific policies such as for example, time 
limits, work-related activity requirements, sanctions, and financial work incentives. 
The Urban Institute has collected and coded a number of these state policy choices in 
their Welfare Rules Database. Prior to welfare reform many states applied for waivers 
that allowed them to implement some of these policies before the implementation of 
TANF in 1996. Many previous studies use dummy variables to differentiate between 
years before and after TANF, and years before and after a state implemented a 
waiver. Some papers that follow this methodology include Bitler, Gelbach and 
Hoynes (2002), Schoeni and Blank (2002), and Grogger (2003). 
Grogger and Karoly (2005) discuss several drawbacks from this methodology. 
Here I focus on three of the concerns they raised. One concern is that this 
methodology only captures one dimension of policy variation. It only divides the 
sample into pre- and post-reform periods. It provides no information about other 
dimensions of variation that might have an important effect on behavior. For 
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example, one might expect that the specific characteristics of the earnings disregards 
or the sanction policy that is implemented could influence behavior. Secondly, 
Grogger and Karoly (2005) argue that focusing solely on enactment or 
implementation dates may result in a regression specification that is particularly 
susceptible to bias from unobservable trends. If the researcher fails to control for 
state-specific trends post-reform, the policy coefficients may provide biased estimates 
of the effects of reform. Thirdly, many states implemented many policies at once, 
making it very difficult to isolate the effects of individual policies. When each policy 
is identified as a dummy variable, and all policies are adopted together, the lack of 
variation along each individual policy makes it impossible to separately measure the 
effect of individual policies.  
Grogger and Karoly (2005) suggest that one approach to address these 
drawbacks is to characterize the intensity of reforms as opposed to just identifying the 
adoption of reforms. For example, one could create a variable that tries to capture the 
generosity of a financial work incentive or the severity of a sanction policy. 
Researchers that have followed this approach include Fang and Keane (2004), 
Looney (2005) and McKernan and Ratcliffe (2006). 
Grogger and Karoly (2005) point to several advantages of this approach. It 
measures a more policy relevant effect. For example, it doesn’t merely measure the 
effect of the average financial incentive, but the effect of incentives of various sizes. 
This allows the researcher to analyze whether the strength of the reform has an effect 
on the outcome variables. In addition, this approach may reduce collinearity and 
improve the precision of the estimates of specific reforms.  There may be less 
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correlation among quantitative measures of bundled policies than among the dummy 
indicators since the intensity of reforms varies even among states that implemented 
the same mix of reforms at the same time.  
However, even after explaining the advantages of using more detailed and 
quantitative measures of each policy, Grogger and Karoly (2005) point out how 
difficult this can be. For example, time limits vary in their length, the magnitude of 
benefit reduction once the time limit is reached, and in the availability of exemptions 
and extensions. Sanction policies also vary by a number of details that make it 
difficult to code into a specific “sanction policy” variable. Grogger and Karoly show 
how four different sets of analysts attempted to characterize state sanction policies as 
either lenient, intermediate, or stringent. The four sets of analysts only agreed in 
twenty-eight of the fifty states and DC. In Pennsylvania, for example, sanction 
policies were rated as lenient by one set of analysts, intermediate by two sets of 
analysts, and stringent by the other. Karoly and Grogger raise the concern that if 
analysts cannot agree on what a strict sanction policy is, the effects of a “strict” 
sanction policy may vary across studies for reasons that have to do more with 
measurement than with the policy’s effect on behavior. Grogger and Karoly also raise 
the concern that these detailed measures of policies are usually based on official 
statues and regulations. However, even though states might have similarly written 
policies, they might implement them very differently. For example, there’s evidence 
that states with similar time-limit policies vary in the proportion of people who 
receive extensions when they reach the time limit. 
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Most research papers on the impact of welfare reform were written in the 
early and mid-2000s. Using dummy variables to differentiate between years before 
and after TANF, and years before and after a state implemented a waiver will not 
work for my analysis given that I also want to analyze the impact of how TANF 
programs evolved during the 2000s. A dummy variable that turns on in 1996 and 
stays on thereafter will not be able to capture how a TANF program continued to 
change since 1996. In addition, dummy variables that indicate when a specific policy 
change was implemented have become less useful during the last decade given that 
state policy variation has decreased. This trend of reduced policy variation can be 
seen, for example, by looking at states’ most severe sanction policy for 
noncompliance with work requirements. This is a key policy variable that many 
researches have included in their econometric studies. In 1996, the most severe 
sanction that 41 states imposed on recipients was a partial benefit reduction. By 2003, 
only 10 states had a partial benefit reduction as their most severe sanction and most 
states opted for a more severe sanction of either entire benefit loss or case closure. 
















Figure 1.1: Number of States, by Most Severe Sanction Policy for 
Noncompliance with Work Requirements 
 
Figure 1.1 also shows how most states changed their sanction policies during 
the first few years after 1996, but there have been less policy shifts since then. A 
similar convergence of state policy choices and reduced variation within states over 
time exist if one analyzes other state policies such as the length of time limits, the 
existence of a formal diversion program, or family caps. However, if one were to 
analyze caseload or TANF spending trends over this time period one would find that 
there is more state-by-state and within state over time variation that these policy 




1.3 My Approach and Characteristics of An Ideal Measure 
 
My measurement approach starts with the premise that a program’s benefit 
levels and accessibility matter the most in terms of influencing the behavior of 
individuals and impacting their incomes. A program’s benefit levels and its 
accessibility to people with earnings below the poverty line can largely determine 
how much a program reduces poverty. One would also expect that if a program is to 
influence behavior such as whether to enter the paid labor market, then the size and 
availability of benefits would play a very important role.  
There are various ways that one could measure both benefit levels and 
program access. Before I delve into the data and measurement issues involved let me 
discuss some of the features that I would want an ideal measure to have. At 
minimum, a safety net measure should be able to capture variation by state and by 
year. In addition, it would be helpful for it to capture variation by family size and 
types. For example, many EITC studies were able to draw causal conclusions from 
changes in EITC policies by comparing families with one child to families with two 
children given that from 1993 to 1996 the maximum EITC for families with two 
children increased by $2,045 while it increased by $718 for families with one child. 
Some analysts have also tried to draw causal conclusions by comparing differences in 
how safety net programs are structured for childless, single-parent, and married-
couple families.  
My ideal measure would allow me to compare TANF, SNAP, and EITC 
policies in a consistent way. That would allow me to equitably compare how benefit 
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levels and accessibility of each program impact outcomes such as employment and 
poverty status.  
An ideal measure would be able to isolate policy choices and not vary by the 
poverty level or employment in a state in a given year. For example, it could be that 
per-capita spending on SNAP is higher in Mississippi than in Florida because of 
higher poverty rates in Mississippi. Therefore, per-capita spending on SNAP would 
not be a good measure to compare SNAP policies in Mississippi and Florida. 
Similarly, per-capita SNAP spending in 2008 might be higher than in 2004 because 
2008 was a recession year. I would like a measure that varied by policy choices rather 
than changes in economic conditions.  
My preferred measure would be transparent and easy to explain and replicate.  
A measure that is transparent and easy to explain can be more influential in policy 
debates given that it can be better understood by non-technical but very influential 
audiences such as policy makers, journalists, and policy advocates.   
My ideal measure would take advantage of the best available data. As 
explained in the data section below, different sources of data can vary in quality. 
Household survey data can be less reliable than administrative data given sample size 
and underreporting issues. If both are feasible, I would prefer to use administrative 
data instead of survey data.  
In addition to analyzing the 2000s and 2010s, I would like to analyze the pre-
welfare reform period of the 1980s and early 1990s, therefore my ideal measure 
would go back to 1980.    
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My ideal measure would combine both benefit levels and accessibility levels 
into a single measure. That would provide a single metric with which to analyze both 
the generosity and accessibility of a program. I think that by themselves, benefit 
levels or an access measure provide only an incomplete picture. In order to 
understand a program’s impact on poverty or behavior I need to know both its benefit 
levels and how widely accessible it is.  
I’ve outlined above what I would like the ideal measure to be. In developing a 
measure, I will need to balance trade-offs between some of the characteristics 
discussed above. In the following sections I will delve deeply into the data and 
methodological issues involved in creating a benefit level and accessibility measure. 
In the next section I’ll discuss the pros and cons of different data sources that can be 
used to create a safety net measure.  
1.4 Data Sources 
 
There are three main types of data that can be used to analyze the reach and 
the generosity of safety net programs. The first type of data are a program’s eligibility 
and benefit rules. For example, this can include the maximum benefit amount a 
family can receive; the earnings at which a family starts and stops receiving benefits, 
and the reasons for which one could get sanctioned away from a program. The Urban 
Institute has collected and coded a number of these state policy rules for TANF in 
their Welfare Rules Database. 
A second type of data are the administrative records that are collected by the 
agencies that administer programs. For example, the U.S. Department of Health and 
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Human Services and many state agencies regularly publish data on how many people 
participate and how much money is spent on various aspects of a program. 
A third type of data are large household surveys like the ones that the U.S. 
Census bureau produces. Like many previous researchers, I have chosen to use the 
Annual Social & Economic Supplement (ASEC) from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), commonly known as the March CPS. The CPS microdata which is publicly 
available provides information on labor market participation, family structure, 
demographics, receipt of government benefits, and many other variables. The March 
CPS sample size currently stands at about 100,000 households per year. (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010).  
When using CPS data to analyze different sub-groups within states one needs 
to be very careful about whether one has enough sample size. A rough rule of thumb 
for CPS analyses is that any statistic should be based on at least 30 unweighted 
households. If for example, we were interested in some characteristic of families with 
two children with pre-government income below the poverty line in a single year we 
would quickly run into sample size issues. For example, the CPS unweighted data for 
2005 included 173 such families in California, but only 25 such families in 
Mississippi and 14 such families in Idaho. Some strategies to address this include 
combining multiple years of data and/or analyzing a larger group like for example all 
families with children instead of just families with two children.  
Similarly to other household surveys, the CPS suffers from some 
underreporting of income and benefits. The total amount of government benefits that 
people report receiving in the CPS falls short of the actual figures according to 
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administrative data. Changes in the degree of underreporting over time could be 
particularly problematic for time series analyses. (Wheaton, 2007) One way to 
address this issue is to augment CPS data using a microsimulation model that corrects 
for underreporting. Sherman and Trisi (2015) use this approach, and that’s also my 
approach here. I correct for the tendency of CPS data to underreport income from 
three government assistance programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). To make these corrections, I use 
baseline data from the Transfer Income Model Version III (TRIM III) policy micro-
simulation model developed by the Urban Institute under contract with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation. TRIM starts with Census survey data but uses a different method of 
filling in questions skipped by survey respondents regarding program participation 
and benefit income, in order to closely match actual numbers and characteristics of 
benefit recipients shown in administrative records. As shown in Table 1.1, the 
problem of underreporting of AFDC/TANF cash assistance has gotten worse over 
time. However, TRIM corrections can help fix this problem by keeping totals closer 




Table 1.1: Comparison of Administrative AFDC/TANF data to CPS data, 1993-
2012 
  
Total expenditures on cash AFDC/TANF 
assistance  
(in billions of current dollars) 
Percent of administrative 
total captured by: 
  
Admin. 
data CPS data 
CPS data 
augmented 




1993 22.3 17.1 20.8 77% 93% 
1996 20.4 13.2 17.7 65% 87% 
2000 11.2 5.7 9.4 51% 84% 
2003 10.2 5.7 9.1 56% 89% 
2006 9.9 4.1 8.5 42% 86% 
2009 9.3 4.6 8.3 49% 89% 
2012 9.0 4.3 8.2 48% 91% 
Source: AFDC/TANF administrative expenditure data from U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (1998) and Schott, Pavetti and Floyd (2015). CPS and CPS TRIM analysis conducted by 
author.  
 
 The data necessary to do this underreporting correction is currently available 
for the years 1993-2012. Given the underreporting issues, to the extent possible, I use 
CPS data augmented by the TRIM model. For the pre-1993 period when TRIM is not 
available, I use administrative data to adjust raw figures from the CPS. The 
methodology I use for this adjustment is explained below.  
1.5 Potential Measures 
 
In this section I present six potential measures to capture the reach of 
AFDC/TANF programs by state and year. I will briefly describe each measure and 
discuss some of its advantages and disadvantages.  
1.5.1 Average AFDC/TANF Benefits per Family in Poverty 
 This measure uses March CPS data and is calculated by dividing the total 
amount of AFDC/TANF cash assistance received by families with children and 
private income below the poverty line in each state by the number of families with 
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children and private income below the poverty line. In 2012, the poverty line for a 
family of two parents and two children was at about $23,000. 
  A very appealing characteristic of this measure is that it takes into account 
both participation rates and benefits generosity. That’s because the numerator uses 
dollars spent as opposed to number of participants and the denominator includes all 
families with children and private income below the poverty line regardless of 
whether they participate in AFDC or TANF. Table 1.2 shows these calculations for 
four hypothetical states that have 100,000 families in poverty but vary in terms of the 
generosity of their TANF benefits (see column A) and the reach of their TANF 
programs (see column B). The average annual TANF benefits per family in poverty 
measure (column F) captures differences between these four states in both their 
benefit levels and the reach of their TANF programs.   
Table 1.2: Example Calculations of Average Annual TANF Benefits per Family 
in Poverty for Four Hypothetical States 

































= E ÷ C 
State 1 $8,400 20,000 100,000 20 $168,000,000 $1,680 
State 2 $3,600 20,000 100,000 20 $72,000,000 $720 
State 3 $8,400 50,000 100,000 50 $420,000,000 $4,200 
State 4 $3,600 50,000 100,000 50 $180,000,000 $1,800 
 
 A disadvantage of this measure is that it’s solely based on March CPS data 
and therefore can suffer both from underreporting and sample size issues. The sample 
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size in the March CPS is not large enough so that I could do this analysis by state and 
by family size which was one of the characteristics that I wanted in my ideal measure. 
Even to create a measure that groups all families together regardless of family size, I 
need to merge multiple years of CPS data in order to create state-by-state measures. 
For this measure, I use three-year averages of CPS data. Therefore, for example, my 
measure for Wisconsin for 1994, would average together 1993-1995.  
 In order to diminish the impact of underreporting I use TRIM data which is 
available between 1993 and 2012. Before 1993 when TRIM data are not available, I 
calculate the percent of total AFDC spending found in the CPS that went to families 
with children and private income below the poverty line. I then apply that percent to 
the administrative data on total AFDC cash assistance spending, and divide that 
figure by the number of families with children in poverty to get an average benefits 
per family in poverty figure.  
 Another disadvantage of this measure is that it could be influenced by 
variation of economic conditions between states and across time. Using a 
denominator of families with pre-government income below the poverty line helps to 
take into account various levels of need across states, but it does not take into account 
the fact that some states might vary in terms of their depth of poverty.  
1.5.2 The TANF-to-Poverty Ratio 
The TANF-to-Poverty Ratio is a measure that I helped develop at the Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). Trisi and Pavetti (2012) provide state by 
state data on the ratio of the number of families receiving AFDC/TANF benefits to 
the number of families with children in poverty. Floyd, Pavetti and Schott (2015) 
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extended these data up to 2014. These papers find that in 1996, for every 100 families 
with children living in poverty, TANF provided cash aid to 68 families.  By 2014, it 
provided cash assistance to only 23 such families for every 100 in poverty. See Figure 
1.2.  We refer to these as TANF-to-poverty ratios.  
Figure 1.2: TANF-to-Poverty Ratio, 1979-2014 
 
 
The TANF-to-Poverty ratios are calculated by dividing the number of TANF 
cases by the number of families with children in poverty. The number of TANF cases 
come from administrative data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) or, since September 2006, data collected from state TANF agencies 
by CBPP1. The poverty data comes from the CPS. Two-year averages of CPS data are 
                                                 
1 The TANF caseload data that CBPP collected from state agencies differ from the official HHS TANF 
data in two important ways. First, they include cases from solely state-funded programs. Second, 
unlike the HHS data, the data collected by CBPP exclude cases in worker supplement programs. These 
modifications allow for a more consistent trend of the number of families receiving cash assistance in 




used to improve reliability given the relatively small sample size of the CPS in some 
states.  
Many of the welfare policies that states implemented influence these ratios 
given that they impact the ease of access to TANF programs and how likely recipients 
are to be sanctioned off the program. Policies that states implement that determine the 
requirements and benefits that recipients face also influence these ratios by impacting 
whether current recipients want to continue in the program or whether potential 
recipients want to apply to the program. Therefore, these ratios can provide a good 
summary of the impact of such policies. These ratios can capture both differences 
between states and across time. For example, Georgia’s TANF-to-poverty ratio 
dropped from 98 to 8 between 1994-95 and 2009-10, while California’s ratio dropped 
from 97 to 66 over the same time period. See Figure 1.3. 




This measure scores high on many of the characteristics that I outlined I 
would want in an ideal measure. For example, it can be constructed for all 50 states 
and DC back to at least 1980. It consists of high quality data by using administrative 
caseload data and the CPS for poverty data which is the source for official U.S. 
government poverty statistics. It is also easy to explain and to replicate. The main 
drawback is that the TANF-to-poverty measure is mostly only an accessibility 
measure. I’m seeking a single metric that captures both a program’s benefit levels and 
accessibility. For example, Tennessee and Wisconsin had similar TANF-to-poverty 
ratios in 2013-2014, 24.9 and 26.4 respectively. However, in 2014 the maximum 
TANF benefit in Tennessee for a family of three was $185, while it was $653 in 
Wisconsin. The TANF-to-poverty ratio is not able to capture this important difference 
between Tennessee’s and Wisconsin’s TANF program.  
In this paper, I make two adjustments to the way that the TANF-to-Poverty 
ratios are calculated compared to the CBPP papers. First, I use three years of CPS 
data for each state instead of two-year averages. I do this to improve reliability, and 
so that I can use the middle year of the three year average as the measurement year 
that I can use to compare this measure to other annual data. Secondly, I create the 
denominator for the ratios by counting up the number of families with children with 
non-government income below 100 percent of the poverty line instead of the number 
of families with children in poverty according to the official poverty measure. For the 
low income population, non-government income means mostly earnings, but can also 
include other sources of private income such as rents, interest, and pensions. The 
official poverty measure counts all cash income which includes private income plus 
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income from cash public benefits such as TANF, unemployment insurance, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Social Security and workers compensation.  
I do this because I’m interested in understanding how TANF and other safety 
net programs reach families at different points in the earnings distribution. I don’t 
want my findings to be confounded by what cash government benefits those families 
are receiving. It’s possible for a family to be above the poverty line when private 
income plus TANF or other cash government income are counted, but below the 
poverty line when only private income is counted. For my analysis of the reach of 
safety net programs, I prefer to keep those families in my denominator, and therefore 
I prefer to define my denominator using only the pre-government income of families. 
(In this paper, I use pre-government and private income interchangeably.) Overall, 
this adjustment does not change much the state-by-state and over-time trends found in 
the CBPP papers. For example, using this methodology, I find that in 1996, for every 
100 families with children with private income below the poverty line, TANF 
provided cash aid to 58 families.  By 2012, it provided cash assistance to only 22 such 
families for every 100 with private income below the poverty line.  
1.5.3 Maximum Benefit Amount 
Maximum benefit level amounts by state and year are widely available. The 
University of Kentucky’s Center for Poverty Research’s national welfare data set 
includes maximum AFDC/TANF benefits for various family sizes for 1980-2013. 
They collected these data from the Green Book published by the Committee on Ways 
and Means of the United States House of Representatives, the Congressional 
Research Service, and the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database. 
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Many researchers have used the state-level maximum AFDC/TANF benefit 
for a family of three as one of the policy variables in their regressions. However, the 
maximum benefit amount by itself provides an incomplete measure of the reach of a 
safety net program. That’s because it doesn’t take into account both what share of 
program participants receive the maximum benefit and what share of the eligible 
population participates. If those two rates change over time or differ between states, 
this wouldn’t get captured by this measure.  
1.5.4 Maximum Benefit Amount Adjusted by TANF-to-Poverty Ratio 
This measure consist of multiplying together the two measures explained in 
the last two sections. This creates a measure that tries to both capture the generosity 
and availability of benefits.  
This measure ranks high in terms of transparency and using the best available 
data given that it uses program eligibility data for the maximum benefits, 
administrative data for the caseload counts, and only relies on survey data to create 
the denominator of families with private income below the poverty line. This measure 
can easily be created to go back to at least 1980, and doesn’t require adjusting the 
CPS data for underreporting of TANF benefits since the TANF data it uses doesn’t 
come from the CPS.   
This measure can also be used to create a variable that varies by family size 
given that the maximum benefit levels are available for different family sizes. The 
sample size in the CPS is not large enough to be able to calculate TANF-to-Poverty 
ratios for different family types in each state. Therefore, I use the same state-level 
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TANF-to-poverty ratio to adjust the maximum benefit amounts for different family 
sizes in a given state and year.  
The adjustment by TANF-to-Poverty Ratio is important given that not all 
eligible families receive benefits. U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) publishes 
an annual report to Congress that includes national level AFDC/TANF take-up rates 
going back to 1981. That report shows that between 1981 and 1996 participation rates 
in the AFDC program ranged from 77 percent to 86 percent. After TANF was 
implemented in 1996, participation rates declined. The participation rate for 
AFDC/TANF in 1996 was 79 percent. By 2012, only 32 percent of eligible families 
participated in the TANF program. 
Although trends in the TANF-to-Poverty ratio are similar to trends in 
AFDC/TANF participation rates, I prefer using the TANF-to-Poverty ratio for the 
purpose of comparing the reach of AFDC/TANF across time and between states. 
That’s because a TANF-to-Poverty ratio allows me to more equitably compare states 
that might differ in their eligibility rules. A state can enact restrictive eligibility rules 
such as short time limits and low earnings thresholds that shrink the pool of eligible 
families, yet have a high participation rate if a high percentage of those eligible 
families participate. In the case of two states that have similar participation rates, but 
differ in the restrictiveness of their eligibility rules, the TANF-to-Poverty ratio would 
perform better than a pure participation measure in identifying the state that reaches a 
higher percent of families in poverty.  
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1.5.5 Simulated Average Benefits per Family in Poverty 
This measure is similar to the one used by Hoynes and Patel (2015). The goal 
is to create a metric like the “Average AFDC/TANF Benefits per Family in Poverty” 
described in section 1.5.1 that keeps differences in demographics and economic 
conditions between states and across time constant.  
A problem of the average benefits per family in poverty measure is that 
changes over time could be driven by changes in a state’s demographics or depth of 
poverty instead of policy changes or changes in participation rates. For example, 
given that benefits are generally larger for families with more children, a decline in 
the average TANF benefits per family in poverty could be driven by families having 
less kids. Similarly, given that benefits are generally larger for families with less 
earnings, a decline in average TANF benefits per family in poverty could be caused 
by more families increasing their earnings but still remaining below the poverty line.  
One option to deal with these issues is to select a sample of families with 
children and calculate for each of them what AFDC/TANF benefits they would be 
eligible for in each year and each state included in the analysis. One could then 
aggregate those benefits across all families with private income below the poverty 
line, and divide that by the number of families with private income below the poverty 
line. That would provide an average AFDC/TANF benefit eligible for amount for 
families with children and private income below the poverty line for each state and 
year. 
TANF benefit and eligibility rules are quite complex and can vary greatly by 
state. Constructing a TANF benefits calculator that takes into account all the rules in 
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every state for each year between 1980 and 2012 is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, I’ve created a generic TANF benefits calculator that estimates a family’s 
annual AFDC/TANF benefits based on their earnings and number of children and the 
maximum benefits amount in their state and year. 
EligibleAnnualBenefits = MaximumMonthlyBenefits*12 - .67*FamilyAnnualEarnings 
The MaximumMonthlyBenefits vary by state and year and family sizes of 
two, three or four people. The FamilyAnnualEarnings vary by each family. The 
phasedown rate of 33 percent was chosen because that’s been the most common 
phasedown rate for AFDC/TANF programs. The MaximumMonthlyBenefit for a 
family of four is used for families larger than four people.  
Hoynes and Patel (2015) use an AFDC/TANF benefits calculator that includes 
state and year specific parameters for phasedown rates and earnings disregards which 
they’ve compiled. The use of those parameters would improve my benefits calculator.  
Hoynes and Patel (2015) create their simulated AFDC/TANF benefits variable 
by starting with a sample of single women from the March 1983 CPS. They then 
replicate that sample for each year in their analysis (1985-2014) and adjust each 
source of income for inflation. Then they pass each sample through their 
AFDC/TANF benefits calculator for each year and take average AFDC/TANF 
benefits by year, state and family size.  
 I follow a very similar procedure, but in my starting sample I include all years 
in my analysis, 1980-2012. I do this to make sure that my results are not driven by my 
choice of sample year. I then run the entire USA sample of single women through my 
24 
 
calculator for each state and year in my analysis (1980-2012). That way my variable 
will vary by state-year-family size only due to policy differences, not due to 
demographic or economic differences between states or across time.  
1.5.6 Simulated Average Benefits per Family in Poverty Adjusted by TANF-to-
Poverty Ratio 
This measure consists of multiplying together the simulated average benefits 
explained in the previous section with the TANF-to-Poverty ratio explained in section 
1.5.2. This creates a measure that tries to both capture the generosity and availability 
of benefits. As explained in section 1.5.3, this adjustment is important given that not 
all eligible families receive AFDC/TANF benefits and access to benefits varies by 
state and has changed over time.  
1.6 Compare Measures to Each Other 
 
In this section I will evaluate the proposed measures by analyzing how they 
perform in tracking changes in the reach of AFDC/TANF in California, Georgia, 
Ohio and Wisconsin. I chose these four states because they vary in terms of their 
TANF-to-Poverty Ratios and their maximum AFDC/TANF benefits. California and 
Wisconsin have higher AFDC/TANF benefits than Georgia and Ohio. TANF-to-
Poverty Ratios dropped dramatically after 1996 in Georgia, Ohio, and Wisconsin, but 
not as much in California. (See Figure 1.4.) 
The average benefits per family in poverty explained in section 1.5.1 can 
serve as a validity check for the other measures. That measure does a good job of 
differentiating between the four states in terms of how much AFDC/TANF benefits 
families in poverty receive. It shows how California is a high AFDC/TANF state, 
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Georgia a low one, and Ohio more of a median one. It also shows the dramatic drop 
in the amount of benefits provided by Wisconsin’s AFDC/TANF program. (See 
Measure # 1 in Figure 1.4) 







The TANF-to-Poverty Ratio by itself captures the dramatic decline of TANF’s 
reach after 1996. However, it does not differentiate between the four states in 1994-
1996 since it shows all four states to be at about the same level. (See Measure # 2 in 
Figure 1.4) This is potentially problematic since we know from the average benefits 
per family in poverty measure that, for example, AFDC was a more important income 
support in California than in Georgia.  
The Maximum Monthly TANF Benefits for a family of three reveals some 
differences between states, but it fails to capture the steep decline in the importance 
of TANF as an income support in Wisconsin. (See Measure # 3 in Figure 1.4) This 
shows why the Maximum Monthly TANF Benefit for a Family of 3 Adjusted by the 
TANF-to-Poverty Ratio is a superior measure. It does a good job of capturing 
Wisconsin’s decline, and it also does a good job differentiating California from 
Georgia during the early 1990s period. (See Measure # 4 in Figure 1.4.) 
The simulated Annual TANF Benefits measures (# 5 and # 6 in Figure 1.4) 
reveal almost identical trends to the Maximum Monthly TANF Benefits measures (#3 
and #4 in Figure 1.4). This is not surprising given that the Maximum Monthly TANF 
benefit is the only parameter that varies by state and year in my TANF benefits 
calculator. It would be interesting to see whether it would make a substantial 
difference if I also allowed earning disregards and phasedown rates to vary by state 
and year like Hoynes and Patel (2015) do. My guess is that the trends by state are 
mostly dominated by differences in maximum benefit levels and participation rates 
between states. Before 1996 most states had very similar earning disregards and 
phase-down rates. After 1996, some states adopted much higher earning disregards so 
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that recipients could work full time and still receive welfare benefits. However, 
Matsudaira and Blank (2014) found that changes in TANF earning disregards after 
1996 had little effect on labor supply or income of single mothers. They conclude that 
was because few women used these earnings disregards.  
As I wrote above, I consider comparing my measures to the average 
AFDC/TANF benefit per family in poverty as a good validity check. Figure 1.5 
shows correlations between each of my other measures and the average AFDC/TANF 
benefit per family in poverty. Each dot in the scatter plots represents a state in a given 
year. I present these correlations for 1994 and 2011.   
Figure 1.5: Correlations between Average AFDC/TANF Benefits per Family in 











It’s striking how in 1994 maximum benefits were a good predictor of average 
benefits for families in poverty, but have become a much worse predictor in 2011. 
The correlation coefficient declined from 0.86 in 1994 to 0.55 in 2011. In contrast, 
TANF-to-Poverty Ratios have become a better predictor between 1994 and 2011. 
This argues for the importance of adjusting the maximum and simulated benefits 
measures by the TANF-to-Poverty ratios. The simulated TANF measure is a 
relatively weak predictor of mean TANF benefits per family in poverty in 2011 with a 
correlation of 0.54, but becomes a much better predictor with a correlation of 0.87 
when it is adjusted by TANF-to-Poverty ratios.  
1.7 Can these AFDC/TANF measures be applied to other safety net 
programs? 
 
One of my goals for an ideal measure was one that would compare TANF, 
SNAP, and EITC policies in a consistent way. That would then allow me to use those 
measures to equitably compare how each program impacts outcomes such as 
employment and poverty status.  
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The methodologies described in sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.5 to create maximum 
and simulated benefits for AFDC/TANF could be used to create SNAP and EITC 
measures that are based on their respective program rules. However, if one wanted to 
create measures that account for differences in program participation and access then 
one would need to do an adjustment similar to the TANF-to-Poverty ratio adjustment 
I did for the measures described in sections 1.5.4 and 1.5.6.  When thinking about 
how to do such an adjustment it’s important to keep in mind how eligibility rules 
differ for SNAP and the EITC compared to TANF. For example, the EITC is not 
available to families without any earnings, but is available to families with earnings 
that are much higher than the poverty line. Therefore, an EITC-to-poverty ratio that 
uses all families with children and earnings below the poverty line as its denominator 
would not make sense as a participation/access measure for the EITC. That’s because 
such a denominator would include a number of families who are not eligible to 
participate in the EITC given that they lack earnings and would miss EITC recipient 
families with earnings above the poverty line. Table 1.2 shows the distribution of 




Table 1.3: TANF, SNAP and EITC Benefits for Families with Children by 
Earnings Level, 2012 
  
Total Program Benefits 
Billions of 2012 Dollars Percentages 
TANF SNAP EITC TANF SNAP EITC 
No earnings 3.6 13.2 0.0 46% 27% 0% 
With earnings:             
     below 50% of poverty line 2.1 12.5 5.3 27% 26% 12% 
     between 50-100% of poverty line 1.1 13.8 16.2 14% 28% 38% 
     between 100-150% of poverty line 0.5 6.1 12.4 7% 12% 29% 
     between 150-200% of poverty line 0.3 1.8 5.8 4% 4% 14% 
     between 200-250% of poverty line 0.1 0.6 1.4 2% 1% 3% 
     above 250% of poverty line 0.1 0.5 1.4 1% 1% 3% 
Total 7.9 48.6 42.5 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculations using the March CPS augmented by TRIM data for TANF and SNAP. 
 
  For SNAP, a ratio could be calculated using SNAP administrative caseload 
data for the numerator and March CPS data for the denominator. The numerator 
would be the number of SNAP cases with children. The denominator could be the 
number of families with children and earnings below 130 percent of the poverty line. 
Using a threshold of 130 percent would more closely approach a participation-like 
measure given that the gross monthly income eligibility limit for SNAP is at 130 
percent of the poverty level. 
For the EITC, a ratio could be created using IRS EITC filer data for the 
numerator and CPS data for the denominator. For the numerator, one would ideally 
want the number of EITC filers with at least one qualifying child per year per state. 
The IRS’s Statistics of Income (SOI) program produces annual individual income tax 
return reports that include the number of EITC filers per state. However, I have yet to 
find a data source that provides the number of EITC filers per state and by whether 
they had any qualifying children with data going back to 1980. For the denominator, 
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one could just use the number of EITC filers according to the CPS EITC variable. 
That’s because EITC benefits are modeled instead of being asked of survey 
respondents. Therefore, the CPS variable provides a count of all eligible recipients.  
A challenge is that this methodology will likely yield a participation rate that 
is above 100 percent in some states in some years. Table 1.3 compares the number of 
EITC filers and the amount of EITC they received according to IRS and CPS data for 
2012. The main finding of that table is that the number of filers with qualifying 
children reported by the IRS is much larger than the number of EITC eligible filers 
according to the CPS. Therefore, the CPS does not seem adequate to use as the 
denominator for an EITC access measure that would use IRS data as the numerator.   
Table 1.4: Comparison of EITC CPS data to IRS data, 2012 
Returns with:  
Number of Filers 
(millions) 











    no qualifying children 6.9 6.9 99% $1.8 $1.9 98% 
    one qualifying child 10.2 6.5 158% $22.8 $14.2 161% 
    two qualifying children 7.3 5.2 140% $25.8 $16.9 153% 
    three or more qualifying children 3.5 3.3 108% $13.6 $12.4 110% 
              
All returns 27.8 21.8 128% $64.1 $45.4 141% 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) program and author’s analysis of March CPS.  
 
 Given the findings above, my plan is to assume a 100 percent participation 
rate for the EITC and not do any of the access adjustments I did for the TANF 
measures described in sections 1.5.4 and 1.5.6. I think this is a reasonable approach 
given that the CPS data seems to be undercounting the impact of the EITC and 
studies show that participation rates of the EITC have varied relatively little across 
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time or between states. Maynard and Dollins (2002) reviewed studies of the EITC 
participation rate that covered the 1984 to 1991 period. Those studies estimated the 
EITC participation rate to be as low as 70 percent and as high as 89 percent and 
differed in their methodologies and the years covered. The only state-by-state 
estimates of EITC participation done for multiple years in a consistent way that I was 
able to find cover the 2008-2012 period. These estimates were done by the U.S. 
Census Bureau in collaboration with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and were 
based on American Community Survey (ACS) and IRS data2. These data show that 
compared to TANF there is much less variation across states in the EITC 
participation rate and therefore using a single national participation rate for all the 
states would not be as problematic as using a single national participation rate for 
TANF. Table 1.4 shows how SNAP and especially TANF have a greater range in 
their participation rates across states.  
  
                                                 




Table 1.5: Number of States by EITC, SNAP and TANF Participation Rates, 
2008-2012 
 EITC SNAP TANF 
Less than 10% participation rate 0 0 2 
10-20% 0 0 13 
20-30% 0 0 11 
30-40% 0 0 14 
40-50% 0 0 6 
50-60% 0 9 3 
60-70% 0 34 2 
70-80% 29 8 0 
80-90% 22 0 0 
Higher than 90% participation rate 0 0 0 
Total number of states + DC: 51 51 51 
    
Lowest participation rate in a state 72.8% 52.1% 6.6% 
Highest participation rate in a state 84.0% 76.% 68.9% 
50 states + DC average participation rate: 79.1% 65% 30.0% 
 
Over the four year period, 2008-2012, the national EITC participation rate 
was 79 percent. The highest EITC participation rate was 84 percent in Mississippi and 
the lowest was 73 percent in Oregon. The range of participation rates for TANF was 
much greater with a 7 percent participation rate in Wyoming and a 69 percent 
participation rate in Maine. These data show that it’s much less of a problem to not 
have state-specific participation rates for an EITC measure, while it’s very important 
for a TANF measure to take into account state variation in program access.  
1.8 What do these measures say about how the U.S. safety net has 
changed over the last three decades? 
 
Figure 1.6 shows simulated benefits for AFDC/TANF, SNAP, and the EITC 
at the national level over the 1990-2010 period. The AFDC/TANF figures take into 
account access to benefits by adjusting by state TANF-to-Poverty ratios. A similar 
methodology is used to adjust the SNAP figures using the SNAP quality control (QC) 
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data. The EITC figures are not adjusted for accessibility given the EITC’s high 
participation rate, ease of access and the data issues already discussed.  
Figure 1.6: Simulated AFDC/TANF, SNAP, and EITC policy variables, 1990-
2010 
 
Figure 1.6 shows the trajectory of AFDC/TANF, SNAP, and EITC benefits 
and access policies during the 1990-2010 period. The mean values show the drop in 
AFDC/TANF, the drop and increase of SNAP, and the increase of the EITC. The 
decline in AFDC/TANF is driven by both the erosion of the value of TANF benefits 
and a reduction in access to cash assistance across states.  
The drop of SNAP between 1995 and 2000 reflects the fact that the 1996 
welfare law included some cuts in SNAP eligibility and benefits. In addition, SNAP 
participation declined during that period because of the tightening of access to TANF 
given that some people used to get SNAP as a result of applying for TANF. The 
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increase in SNAP between 2000 and 2010 captured by the SNAP variable in Figure 
1.6 reflect both increases in accessibility and benefit levels. In 2002 and 2008 
Congress enacted changes to the SNAP program that made the program more 
accessible and raised program participation by eligible households. The 2009 
Recovery Act passed by Congress included a temporary increase in monthly SNAP 
benefits which became effective on April 1, 2009 and expired in November 2013. 
The Recovery Act increased monthly SNAP benefits by an average of 15 percent3.  
Figure 1.7 shows the data in Figure 1.6, but for each region.4 This comparison 
across regions highlights the main difference that exists between AFDC/TANF and 
SNAP and the EITC. AFDC/TANF benefit levels are set at the state level, and 
historically, states in the South have provided much less generous AFDC/TANF 
benefits compared to states in the Northeast or the West. In contrast to AFDC/TANF, 
access to SNAP and EITC benefits are fairly similar across states as was shown in 
table 1.5. In addition, SNAP and EITC benefits are determined at the federal level. 
Also very important, is the fact that SNAP and the EITC are not block grants and are 
funded by federal dollars. This means that states don’t have an incentive to reduce 
caseloads in order to free up state dollars.  
                                                 
3 For more information on the Recovery Act’s effect on SNAP, see United States Department of 
Agriculture Economic Research website: http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-
assistance/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-(snap)/arra.aspx  
4 States are grouped by region using the Census Bureau's definition of regions. The Northeast Census 
region consists of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. The Midwest region is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin. 
The South region is defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The West region is defined as Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. 
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In times of increased need such as during the Great Recession, federal dollars 
automatically become available to fund increases in the SNAP or EITC caseload. 
TANF’s block-grant structure had the opposite effect. During the Great Recession, 
when the number of families needing cash assistance increased, states were unable or 
unwilling shift money in their TANF block grant from other purposes to cash 
assistance. Instead, many states responded by cutting TANF benefits and tightening 
eligibility rules, often by shortening time limits or making them more severe in other 
ways (Schott and Pavetti, 2011).  
There are a number of actions that states could do to make their TANF 
programs work as stronger safety nets for families in need. They could increase their 
maximum TANF benefit levels, and could also implement policies to make it easier 
for families to receive benefits. If a state wanted to reach out to families in need, all it 
would need to do is to look at its own SNAP caseload. There are many TANF-eligible 
families in the SNAP caseloads of many states who are currently not receiving 
TANF. Some factors that prevent states from expanding TANF include the lack of 
available funds, the ideological make-up of their legislature, the political dynamics 
within a state, and the incentive structure created by federal TANF policies.  
There are also a number of actions that Congress could take to encourage 
and/or force states to make their TANF programs work as a better safety net for 
families in need. The TANF block grant has lost 30 percent of its value since it was 
created because it has never been adjusted for inflation. Congress could increase the 
value of TANF block grant and reform the rules so that more of its resources are 
devoted to the program’s core purposes of child care, cash assistance and work-
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related activities. Congress could also set minimum benchmarks for benefit levels and 
eligibility rules. Congress could do more to hold states accountable for serving 
families in need. It could use a TANF-to-poverty measure as a metric to require states 
to serve some minimum share of families in poverty or deep poverty. Congress could 
also set up better performance measure to assess the extent to which states help 
families find jobs. Right now, the federal government asks states to meet a work 
participation rate. However, it is not working because states primarily meet it by not 
providing assistance to many poor parents who face various barriers to employment 
(Pavetti & Schott 2016).  
1.9 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to develop measures that capture variation of 
safety net program policies across time and by state. I focused on measuring variation 
in benefit levels and program access because I think those are the most important 
factors in terms of influencing the behavior of individuals and impacting their 
incomes. A program’s benefits amount and its accessibility can largely determine 
how much a program reduces poverty. One would also expect that if a program is to 
influence behavior such as whether to enter the paid labor market, then the size and 
availability of benefits would matter a lot. 
Out of the measures I discussed, the measures described in sections 1.5.4 and 
1.5.6 seem the most promising. These are the maximum and simulated benefits 
measures that are adjusted by the TANF-to-Poverty ratios. Given the dramatic decline 
in the access to TANF since 1996 and how much variation exists in access to TANF 
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across states, it is crucial that any measure take that variation into account. In section 
1.7 I discussed how these measures could be adapted to analyze changes in policies 
for the SNAP and EITC programs.  
The real test for these measures will be done in the next chapter as I use these 
measures to try to explain changes in the employment of single mothers over the 
1980-2012 period. The hope is that these measures will provide enough over time and 
across state variation that I will be able to isolate the impact of AFDC/TANF, EITC, 
and SNAP policies on single mother employment trends.   
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Chapter 2: How did changes in safety net policies during the 




President Bill Clinton's signing of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) on August 22, 1996 marked a 
dramatic change in the history of social policy in the United States. The Act 
eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and 
replaced it with a block grant program called Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). The Act ended the entitlement of poor families to assistance from 
the federal government, instituted a five-year time limit on federal cash benefits, 
imposed stronger work requirements on recipients and devolved most details of 
welfare policy making to the fifty states. The goal of these changes was to move 
single mothers with children who had been receiving AFDC out of "dependency" on 
government assistance and into work outside the home. The Act aimed to reduce 
TANF caseloads, increase work participation, reduce poverty, and promote marriage. 
Many policymakers view the 1996 welfare law which created the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program as a major success. They see TANF 
program's design and block grant structure as a model for the reform of other safety 
net programs. Therefore, it is very important for policy makers to understand what 
welfare reform achieved and did not achieve.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the impact of welfare reform 
by analyzing how various policy changes in the 1990s affected the employment 
trends of single mothers. I choose to focus on this group because historically they 
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have been the most likely to receive welfare benefits and therefore would have been 
the most impacted by the 1996 welfare reform law. In 2011, 58 percent of children in 
poverty lived in single mother families. The poverty rate for children in single mother 
families was 47.7 percent, much higher than the poverty rate for all children, 21.4 
percent.  
Single mothers increased their employment rate by 15 percentage points from 
1992 to 2000. Figure 2.1 shows how single mothers narrowed the gap in employment 
with single women without any own children. Since 2000, both groups have 
decreased their employment levels.  
Figure 2.1: Employment rates for single women, 1980-2012 
 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  




One would expect that welfare reform would have had a bigger impact on 
single mothers than other women given that over 80 percent of the TANF caseload 
has historically been single mother families. However, Figure 2.1 by itself does not 
let us determine whether it was welfare reform or other factors that drove the increase 
in employment. This paper will analyze how policy and economic factors affected the 
employment rate of single mothers in the period between 1992 and 2000, and 
between 2000 and 2012.  
2.2 Literature Review 
 
There is little debate that single mother employment increased during the 
1990s. The controversy is over whether the economy, the EITC, welfare reform or 
other factors were responsible for increasing the employment of single mothers. 
Welfare reform had the good fortune of being implemented shortly after major 
expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and at the beginning of an 
incredibly strong labor market that reached unemployment rates as low as 4 percent. 
These factors, along with the work supports welfare reform provided, made it 
possible for many single mothers to find work. 
A large number of econometric studies have tried to establish a causal link 
between welfare policy reforms and various outcome variables such as welfare use, 
employment, earnings, income, poverty, hardship, marriage, childbearing, and child 
outcomes. The econometric studies generally found that welfare reform had an impact 
both on declines in welfare participation and on increases in work effort, although the 
magnitude of this effect varies across studies. As summarized by Grogger and 
Karoly’s meta-analysis (2005), most econometric studies found that welfare reform as 
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a whole was responsible for about a 20 percent decline in welfare caseloads and a 4 
percent increase in the employment of single mothers.  
However, only a handful of studies (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 
2003; Fang & Keane, 2004; Looney, 2005; Noonan, Smith & Corcoran, 2007) have 
tried to explicitly compare the impact of welfare reform on single mother 
employment relative to the impact of the economy and other policy reforms such as 
the EITC. This paper aims to contribute to that string of the literature.  
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found that during 1984-1996, the EITC 
accounted for 61 percent of the overall change in annual employment of single 
mothers relative to single women without children. Meyer and Rosenbaum also 
analyzed the 1992-1996 period and found that the EITC accounted for a smaller share 
of the change (35 percent), but still had the largest effect on annual employment of 
single mothers during this period compared to other policy variables. Welfare waivers 
(any time limits and whether the state had terminated any cases under a waiver 
provision) accounted for approximately 15-20 percent of the employment increase 
during both periods. The maximum welfare benefit accounted for 11-25 percent of 
the employment increase depending on the measure and time period. Meyer and 
Rosenbaum used data from the March CPS (1985-1997) and the CPS Outgoing 
Rotation Group File (1984-1996). Their sample included all single women ages 19-44 
who were not in school. 
Jeffrey Grogger (2003) found that welfare reform accounted for just 13 
percent of the total rise in employment among single mothers in the 1990s. The EITC 
(which was expanded in 1990 and 1993) and the strong economy were much bigger 
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factors, accounting for 34 percent and 21 percent of the increase, respectively. 
Grogger (2003) used data from the March CPS that covers the period 1978 to 1999.  
Fang and Keane (2004) found that the economy was the most important factor 
behind the 1993-2000 employment increase. It contributed 40 percent to the increase. 
The implementation of TANF work requirements and time limits contributed 13 
percent and 6 percent, respectively, and the EITC contributed 20 percent to the 
increase. When looking at the employment increase between 1993 and 2002, they 
found that the EITC was the most important factor contributing 33 percent to the 
increase while the economy contributed 25 percent. This study used data from the 
March CPS 1981-2003.  
Looney (2005) finds that welfare reform made the largest contribution (26 
percent) to the increase in single mothers’ employment between 1993 and 1999, but 
the impact of taxes was only slightly smaller (22 percent). The economy contributed 
17 percent to the increase and declining welfare benefit generosity contributed 11 
percent. Looney used monthly data on all single mothers from the 1990 and 1996 
SIPP. 
Noonan, Smith, and Corcoran (2007) found that the EITC accounted for the 
largest portion of the employment increase for both black and white single mothers. 
For all single mothers combined, the EITC accounted for 19-25 percent of the 
employment increase from 1991 to 2000, and TANF, unemployment, and 
AFDC/TANF benefit generosity accounted for 6-12 percent each. The size of each 
factor’s impact is slightly different across black and white single mothers, but the 
same overall patterns hold for both groups. The unemployment rate was the only 
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factor that contributed to the change in employment between 2000 and 2003. The 
study used March CPS data from 1991 to 2003, and included all white and black 
single mothers ages 18-54 that lived in a Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
The latest year of analysis for any of these papers was 2003. This paper 
contributes to the literature by incorporating data that extends until 2012. In addition 
to having newer data, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a more 
detailed analysis of how welfare reform and other factors impact different subgroups 
of single mothers. This is important given that single mothers are a fairly 
heterogeneous group. I analyze how policies have impacted single mothers differently 
depending on their educational attainment and the age of their youngest child. Most 
previous research papers have focused on the impact of AFDC/TANF and the EITC 
on employment. An important contribution of this paper is that I compare the impact 
of TANF and the EITC with the impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). Using a consistent methodology, I create a 
measure for TANF, SNAP, and the EITC that captures in dollar terms how access and 
benefit levels have changed over time by state and by family size. The fact that I use 
the same methodology to create the measures for the three programs allows me to 
compare how TANF, SNAP, and EITC policies have impacted the employment of 
single mothers in a more consistent and easier to understand way than previous 






Choice of Data Set 
Like many previous researchers, I have chosen to use the Annual Social & 
Economic Supplement (ASEC) from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
commonly known as the March CPS. The CPS microdata which is publicly available 
provides information on labor market participation, family structure, demographics, 
receipt of government benefits, and many other variables. The March CPS sample 
size currently stands at about 100,000 households per year. (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). This paper uses March CPS data covering the years 1980-2012.  
Level of Analysis & Sample 
In order to be able to compare the impact of individual level and macro level 
variables, I have decided to conduct my analysis at the individual level. Doing the 
analysis at the individual level also allows me to more easily take into account 
individual characteristics such as the age and education level of the person. I limit the 
sample to all single women between the ages of 18 and 54. Similarly to Hoynes and 
Patel (2015), I drop from the sample women who did not work during the previous 
year because of illness, disability or school enrollment because these women have 
visibly different incentives entering the work decision. All women except those who 
are married and have a spouse present in the household are counted as single women. 
Under this definition single women include the never married, separated, widowed, 
divorced and those who are married but their spouse is not present in the household. 
This definition of single women matches the one used by Census to identify female 
family heads. I define as a mother someone living with an own child younger than 18. 
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Choice of Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable is whether someone worked during the year. The 
March CPS asks respondents how many weeks they worked during the prior calendar 
year. My dependent variable has a value of 0 if someone did not work during the 
prior year and a value of 1 if someone did work during the prior year.  
Measurement of Safety Net Policies 
The observational econometric studies analyzing the impact of welfare reform 
make use of the variation that exists between states and over time in their 
implementation of welfare policies.  
Under TANF states have a significant amount of flexibility in how they design 
their TANF programs. States have great flexibility in their choice of benefit levels, 
entry and work participation requirements, sanctions, time limits, family caps, earning 
disregards, exemptions, and other policies. The Urban Institute has collected and 
coded a number of these state policy choices in their Welfare Rules Database. Prior to 
welfare reform many states applied for waivers that allowed them to implement some 
of these policies before the implementation of TANF in 1996. Many previous studies 
use dummy variables to differentiate between years before and after TANF, and years 
before and after a state implemented a waiver.  
Using a dummy variable like many previous researches seems unwise in my 
case because my goal is to analyze the impact of welfare reform policies in the 2000s 
and states have implemented various additional reforms to those they implemented 
during the 1990s. Therefore, I need to use a measurement of welfare policies that is 
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able to capture additional policy reforms states implemented since 1996 and is able to 
better capture the differences between state policies. 
My measurement approach starts with the premise that a program’s benefit 
levels and accessibility matter the most in terms of influencing the behavior of 
individuals and impacting their incomes. A program’s benefit levels and its 
accessibility to people with earnings below the poverty line can largely determine 
how much a program reduces poverty. One would also expect that if a program is to 
influence behavior such as whether to enter the paid labor market, then the size and 
availability of benefits would play a very important role.  
In chapter 1 of this dissertation I discussed six potential metrics to measure 
how access and benefit levels of AFDC/TANF changed after the 1996 welfare law. 
The regressions in this paper use the simulated annual benefits adjusted by the 
TANF-to-Poverty ratio measure. I adapt that methodology to created similar 
measures for SNAP and the EITC.  
Some researchers have included a number of additional policy variables 
beyond the three that I’ve included. Fang and Keane (2004) were the most 
comprehensive in their approach. In addition to variables for TANF, SNAP and the 
EITC, they included variables for the minimum wage, child care subsidies, Medicaid, 
child support enforcement, and the federal income tax rate for the lowest bracket. 
Looney (2005) included policy variables for AFDC/TANF, Medicaid, the EITC and 
other taxes. Grogger (2003) included variables for TANF, the EITC, and the 
minimum wage. Hoynes and Patel (2015) included variables for TANF, the EITC and 
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other taxes. Noonan, Smith and Corcoran (2007) included policy variables for just 
TANF and the EITC.  
Many previous researchers did not include SNAP, but I think the inclusion of 
SNAP in my model is important given its growth over the last decade. The fact that 
my model has only three policy variables has the advantage that it makes 
interpretation and presentation easier compared to more complex models. As 
discussed below, my model adequately fits the data and produces results that are in 
line with previous research. However, in future research, I would like to investigate 
how including additional policy variables will impact the fit of my model and results.  
Economic Variables 
Almost all studies control for macroeconomic factors using state 
unemployment rates, which is what I do in this paper. Some studies went further by 
also controlling for state GDP, state median income, and state wages at the 25th 
percentile. In future research, I plan to test whether controlling for these variables 




2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2.1 provides employment rates for single women between the ages of 
18 and 54 by various characteristics. The first two columns show what percent of my 
sample belongs to each category. Data for single mothers and single women without 
children are provided separately given their different characteristics. The remaining 
columns compare 1992 and 2000 employment rates, the period over which 
employment levels increased the most for single mothers. The first row of data shows 
that between 1992 and 2000 employment for single mothers increased by 15 
percentage points while employment for single women without children remained 
flat. This pattern of single mothers increasing their employment more than single 
women without children holds true across all characteristics. Another general pattern 
is that those single mothers with the lowest employment levels in 1992 increased their 




Table 2.1: Employment Rates of Single Women Age 18-54 by Various 
Characteristics, 1992-2000 




Single women  














All 100% 100% 74% 89% 15% 93% 94% 0% 
Number of children and their 
age 
                
one child, youngest is 0-3 14% n.a 69% 85% 16% n.a n.a n.a 
one child, youngest is 4-7 11% n.a 83% 92% 9% n.a n.a n.a 
one child, youngest is 8-17 26% n.a 87% 95% 9% n.a n.a n.a 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 17% n.a 49% 79% 29% n.a n.a n.a 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 14% n.a 72% 87% 16% n.a n.a n.a 
2+ children, youngest is 8-
17 
18% n.a 81% 92% 12% n.a n.a n.a 
Own Age                 
18-24 17% 37% 59% 81% 22% 95% 95% 0% 
25-34 37% 24% 72% 88% 17% 93% 94% 1% 
35-44 36% 18% 81% 92% 11% 92% 92% 0% 
45-54 10% 21% 82% 95% 13% 91% 92% 1% 
Educational Attainment                 
No high school degree 20% 12% 47% 74% 27% 76% 81% 5% 
High school degree only 38% 28% 75% 89% 14% 91% 92% 1% 
Some college 31% 36% 87% 94% 7% 97% 97% -1% 
BA degree or more 11% 24% 93% 97% 4% 98% 97% -1% 
Race/Ethnicity                 
White 51% 71% 82% 92% 11% 96% 96% 0% 
Black 31% 15% 66% 89% 22% 87% 92% 5% 
Hispanic 15% 9% 61% 80% 19% 84% 87% 3% 
Other 3% 5% 67% 90% 22% 92% 92% 0% 
Marital Status                 
Divorced 37% 21% 85% 94% 9% 94% 94% 0% 
Never married 40% 70% 63% 85% 23% 94% 94% 0% 
Other, spouse absent 23% 9% 71% 87% 16% 86% 88% 2% 
Notes for Table 2.1: "Other, spouse absent" consists of separated, married but spouse absent and 
widowed. Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis. 




Mothers of very young children are less likely to be employed than mothers of 
older children or women without children. For example, the employment rate of 
single mothers with one child who is under the age of four was 82 percent in 2000 
compared to 94 percent for those with a youngest child over the age 7, and 94 percent 
for single women without any children. However, between 1992 and 2000, single 
mothers with a youngest child under the age of four increased their employment rate 
more than other single women.   
Single mothers in the 18-24 age group are less likely to be employed than 
single mothers in the 25-34, 35-44, or 45-54 age groups. However, single mothers in 
the 18-24 age group increased their employment the most between 1992 and 2000. 
The employment levels of single women without children vary less by age group, but 
younger women have slightly higher employment levels. The employment levels of 
single women without children stayed fairly flat regardless of their age group.  
Single women who did not graduate from high school are less likely to work 
than women who have a high school degree. In 2000, the employment rate of single 
mothers who did not finish high school was 74 percent compared to 89 percent for 
mothers with only a high school degree. Similarly, the employment rate for single 
women with no children without a high school degree was 81 percent compared to 92 
percent for those with only a high school degree. However, women without a high 
school degree were the ones that increased their work the most between 1992 and 
2000. Single mothers without a high school degree increased their employment level 
by 27 percentage points.  
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Employment rates for non-white single mothers were lower than employment 
rates of white single mothers in 1992. However, non-white mothers saw the biggest 
increase in employment levels between 1992 and 2000. Employment rates of single 
women without children varied less by race and ethnicity, but black and Hispanic 
women increased their employment the most between 1992 and 2000.  
Never-married mothers and other types of single mothers have lower 
employment rates than divorced women. However, these two groups increased their 
employment rates by a lot more than divorced mothers between 1992 and 2000.  
Figure 2.2 shows the employment rates for single mothers by educational 
attainment. This makes clear how the biggest increase in employment between 1992 




Figure 2.2: Employment rates for single mothers by educational attainment, 
1980-2012 
 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  
Source: Author’s analysis of March Current Population Survey. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the employment rates for single women with a high school 
education or less by whether they have children and the age of their youngest child. 
These data show how mothers with the youngest children increased their employment 
the most over the 1992-2000 period. Mothers with children who were at least 8 years 
old already had employment levels of close to 80 percent before 1992. This means 
that most of the employment increase among single mothers during the 1990s was 




Since 2000, the employment rate has fallen for all single women with a high 
school education or less regardless of whether they have children. This suggests that 
at least part of the reason for the decline in employment is due to the economy and 
the labor market for people with a high school education or less as opposed to safety 
net benefits that are mostly only available to families with children.  
Figure 2.3: Employment rates for single women with a high school education or 
less by presence and age of children, 1980-2012 
 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  
Source: Author’s analysis of March Current Population Survey. 
  
Another way to analyze the relationship between employment and age of 
youngest child is to look at the employment levels in a given year for single mothers 
grouped by the age of their youngest child. Figure 2.4 does this for 1991-1993 and 
1999-2001 for single mothers with a high school education or less. I combined three 
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years of data in order to have more sample size and improve reliability. Across both 
time periods the general pattern emerges that single mothers with older children have 
higher employment rates than single mothers with very young children.  
Figure 2.4: Employment rates for single mothers with a high school education or 
less by age of youngest child 
 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  
Source: Author’s analysis of March Current Population Survey. 
 
Comparing the red line (1991-1993) to the blue line (1999-2001) in Figure 2.4 
shows how much employment increased between those years among single mothers 
with a youngest child of the same age. It’s striking how much of that increase was 
among single mothers with very young children.  
 So far my analysis has looked at employment rates defined as whether 
someone worked at all during the year. To some, that might seem like too low of a 
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threshold to focus on. Table 2.2 shows the percent of single women that worked 
during the year at least 500, 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 hours. These thresholds of hours 
worked can be roughly interpreted as working at least 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 
percent and 100 percent of the year. If someone works 40 hours per week for 52 
weeks that adds up to 2,080 hours worked during the year5.  
  
                                                 
5 At least 2,000 hours worked is probably too strict of a definition of full-time year-around work. The 
Census Bureau defines full-time year-round workers as those who usually worked 35 hours or more 
per week for 50-52 weeks a year. That definition adds up to at least 1,750 hours worked during the 
year. See Census Bureau website: https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/laborfor/faq.html#Q7 
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Table 2.2: Employment rates for single women with a high school education or 
less by amount of hours worked, 1980-2012 
  1992 2000 Difference 
Percent that worked during year       
Single women with no children 87% 88% 2% 
Single mothers 65% 84% 19% 
Youngest child is 0-3 50% 76% 27% 
Youngest child is 4-7 68% 84% 16% 
Youngest child is 8-17 78% 91% 13% 
Percent that worked at least 500 hours during year       
Single women with no children 76% 77% 1% 
Single mothers 55% 76% 20% 
Youngest child is 0-3 37% 63% 26% 
Youngest child is 4-7 60% 79% 19% 
Youngest child is 8-17 71% 85% 14% 
Percent that worked at least 1,000 hours during year       
Single women with no children 67% 68% 1% 
Single mothers 48% 68% 20% 
Youngest child is 0-3 29% 53% 24% 
Youngest child is 4-7 53% 72% 19% 
Youngest child is 8-17 65% 79% 14% 
Percent that worked at least 1,500 hours during year       
Single women with no children 57% 59% 1% 
Single mothers 40% 59% 19% 
Youngest child is 0-3 20% 42% 22% 
Youngest child is 4-7 43% 63% 20% 
Youngest child is 8-17 57% 71% 14% 
Percent that worked at least 2,000 hours during year       
Single women with no children 42% 46% 4% 
Single mothers 28% 43% 14% 
Youngest child is 0-3 13% 27% 14% 
Youngest child is 4-7 31% 47% 16% 
Youngest child is 8-17 42% 54% 12% 
 
Table 2.2 shows that the finding that single mothers increased their 
employment over the 1992 to 2000 period relative to single women with no children 
is robust regardless of the threshold of hours worked that one uses to define someone 
as employed. In 1992 there was a large gap in the employment levels of single 
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mothers and single women not raising children, but gap narrowed dramatically 
regardless of the threshold of hours worked used. It’s also true that across various 
definitions of employment, single mothers with the youngest children increased their 
employment the most.       
 Another way to analyze the labor market participation of individuals is to 
examine the average hours worked in a year. Figure 2.5 shows this for single mothers 
grouped by their educational attainment. This measure averages together the hours of 
non-workers (those with zero hours) and workers. The advantage of this metric is that 
it captures both people moving from no work to work and those moving from part-
time to full-time work. Between 1992 and 2000, single mothers without a high school 
degree increased their average hours worked per year by 485 hours.  Single mothers 
with a high school degree and no further education increased their annual work by 
333 hours. This compares to an increase of 239 hours by those with some college 
education and no BA degree, and an increase of 76 hours by those with a BA degree. 
This pattern is very similar to the pattern in Figure 2.2 that showed that single 
mothers with no college education increased their employment levels more than 










Figure 2.5: Average hours worked by single mothers by educational attainment, 
1980-2012 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  
Source: Author’s analysis of March Current Population Survey. 
 
 Figure 2.6 shows the average hours worked in a year for single mothers by the 
presence and age of their youngest child. It is striking how single mothers on average 
are able to work just as much or even more hours than single women without children 
with comparable education levels given that in order to work single mothers have the 
extra challenge of figuring out child care arrangements. Since the mid-1990s single 
mothers with a high school degree or less and a youngest child between the ages of 8 
and 17 years old have worked more hours per year than single women without 
children. Since 2000, single mothers with a high school degree or less education and a 
youngest child who is 4-7 years old have worked just as many hours as single women 
without children.   
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Figure 2.6: Average hours worked by single women with a high school education 
or less by presence and age of children, 1980-2012 
 
Note: Women who did not work during the previous year because of illness, disability or school 
enrollment are not included in the analysis.  
Source: Author’s analysis of March Current Population Survey. 
 
 Most research studies on the effect of safety net programs on employment 
outcomes analyze whether someone works as opposed to how much someone works. 
Therefore, in this paper, the dependent variable in my regression analysis is whether 
someone worked during the year. In future research, I’m interested in investigating 
whether safety net programs and other factors have a similar effect on the amount of 





Table 2.3 provides mean values for the safety net and economic variables I 
include in my analysis. The table shows how, between 1992 and 2000, the 
unemployment rate declined and the EITC became more generous, especially for 
adults with two or more children. During the same period, TANF and SNAP declined. 
Between 2000 and 2010, state unemployment rates increased substantially, while the 
EITC remained fairly flat. TANF further declined between 2000 and 2010 while 
SNAP increased.  
Table 2.3: Mean Values for Policy and Economic Variables, 1980-2012 
  
Mean values (All dollar figures are in 2012 dollars) 
1980 1992 1995 2000 2002 2007 2010 2012 
Simulated mean EITC                 
no children $0 $0 $55 $55 $56 $56 $58 $56 
1 child $385 $896 $1,358 $1,360 $1,413 $1,379 $1,424 $1,388 
2+ children $440 $1,028 $2,166 $2,467 $2,552 $2,501 $2,723 $2,666 
Simulated mean 
AFDC/TANF 
                
no children $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
1 child $1,416 $1,104 $1,013 $649 $537 $404 $354 $308 
2+ children $2,630 $2,034 $1,986 $1,210 $989 $737 $640 $594 
Simulated mean SNAP                 
no children $110 $152 $163 $124 $130 $175 $311 $334 
1 child $528 $701 $757 $578 $599 $805 $1,395 $1,499 
2+ children $1,238 $1,678 $1,816 $1,369 $1,456 $1,937 $3,284 $3,523 
State unemployment rate 7.2 7.6 5.7 4.0 5.8 4.6 9.7 8.1 
 
 
Figure 2.7 graphs the mean values of the policy and economic variables for 
single mothers with two children between 1980 and 2012. This makes it easier to see 
how during the 1990s, TANF, SNAP and the unemployment rate declined, while the 
EITC increased. One can also observe the impact of the Great Recession when 
unemployment increased dramatically starting in 2008. SNAP increased during that 
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period both because of an increase in access (participation among the eligible 
population increased) and because of a temporary increase in monthly SNAP benefits 
enacted as part of the Recovery Act which became effective on April 1, 2009 and 
expired in November 2013. The Recovery Act increased monthly SNAP benefits by 
an average of 15 percent6. The EITC also increased in 2009 due to an increase in 
EITC benefits included in the Recovery Act. That expansion has now been made 
permanent.  
Figure 2.7 Mean Values for Policy and Economic Variables for Single Mothers 
with Two or More Children, 1980-2012 
 
  
                                                 
6 For more information on the Recovery Act’s effect on SNAP, see United States Department of 




2.5 Empirical Specification 
 
 I use a logistic regression model to predict the odds of an individual being 
employed. The main regression model consists of the dependent variable, whether 
someone worked during the year, regressed on individual-level demographic 
variables, individual-level policy variables, and the state-level unemployment rate. 
The main model also includes interactions of the three policy variables and 
unemployment with all the demographic variables, state and year fixed effects, and 
the following six interactions: TANF*SNAP, TANF*EITC, SNAP*EITC, 
unemployment*TANF, unemployment*EITC, and unemployment*SNAP. See Table 
2.4 for a list of all the variables included in my analysis.  
Similarly to Fang and Keane (2004), my specification was not chosen as the 
result of a specification search. I did not choose a specific set of demographic, policy, 
economic variables and interaction terms based on whether they reached significance. 
Instead, I specified a set of demographic, policy, and economic variables, and a full 
set of interaction terms, a priori. The main rational for including interaction terms was 
the notion that policy variables should have different effects on individuals with 
different characteristics. For example, the fixed cost to working is different for a 
mother with a young child, while the labor market opportunities for a woman with 
less than a high school degree is different than for a woman with some college 
education. Therefore, the availability of safety net benefits might impact the decision 
of these women join the labor force in a differently. The reason for including state 




Table 2.4: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
WORK Categorical variable indicating whether woman worked during the 
year 
Individual-level demographic variables 
AGE Categorical variable indicating age of woman (18-24, 35-44 or 45-
54 years old) 
EDU Categorical variable indicating educational attainment (less than 
high school, finished high school, some college, or finished 
college) 
KIDS Categorical variable indicating number of own children and age of 
youngest child of woman (no children, one child 0-3 years old, 
one child 4-7 years old, one child 8-17 years old, two children and 
youngest is 0-3, two children and youngest is 4-7, or two children 
and youngest is 8-17)  
RACE Categorical variable indicating race/ethnicity of woman (white 
non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, or other) 
MARITAL Categorical variable indicating marital status of woman (never 
married, divorced, or other) “Other” includes separated, widowed, 
and married but spouse absent. Married women with husband 
present are not included in the sample. 
State-level economic variable 
UNEMP State unemployment rate 
Individual-level policy variables 
EITC Simulated EITC benefit, varies by number of own children, and 
year. (EITC benefits don’t vary by state. Due to lack of available 
data, a constant participation rate is assumed across all states and 
years.)  
TANF Simulated TANF benefit, varies by number of own children, state, 
and year. (State variation is due to both benefit levels and 
accessibility.)  
SNAP Simulated SNAP benefit, varies by number of own children, state, 
and year. (State variation is due to both benefit levels and 
accessibility. Note state SNAP benefits are the same for all states 
except Alaska and Hawaii.) 
Interaction terms 
UNEMP#AGE, UNEMP#EDU, UNEMP#KIDS, UNEMP#RACE, UNEMP#MARITAL,  
EITC#AGE, EITC#EDU, EITC#KIDS, EITC#RACE, EITC#MARITAL,  
TANF#AGE, TANF#EDU, TANF#KIDS, TANF#RACE, TANF#MARITAL, 
SNAP#AGE, SNAP#EDU, SNAP#KIDS, SNAP#RACE, SNAP#MARITAL,  






The graphs in the following pages plot actual employment rates for different 
groups in my sample compared to the employment rates predicted by my model over 
the 1980-2012 period. 







The graphs in the previous pages generally give me confidence that my model 
is adequately fitting the data and has fairly strong predictive powers across different 
groups of single women in my sample. The inclusion of state and year fixed effects 
did not make much of a difference for the fit of my model. However, my model did 
seem to fit the data better when using the full set of interaction terms.  
Due to the large number of interaction terms in my model, the regression 
coefficients it produces for each variable are difficult to interpret. One would need to 
calculate through all the interactions in order to know what a given variable predicts. 
Therefore, I prefer to present the results of my model showing how different variables 
predict changes in the probability of being employed. Appendix table  
Table 2.5 shows what my model predicts in terms of employment levels for 
women with different characteristics. Changes in the probability of being employed 
are expressed in relation to the baseline scenario of a 25-34 year old white never-






Table 2.5 Changes in Probability of Being Employed Due to Various 
Characteristics 
Changes in probabilities are expressed in relation to the baseline scenario of a 25-34 year old white 
never-married woman with a high school degree and no further education. 
  
Single mothers with one 
child 
Single mothers with two 




children Age of Youngest Child: 0-3 4-7 8-17 0-3 4-7 8-17 
Baseline Employment 79% 86% 90% 66% 76% 83% 92% 
Change in probability of being employed: 
Own Age               
18-24 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% -4.4% -3.6% -2.9% 1.7% 
35-44 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
45-54 -2.3% -1.7% -1.3% -3.8% -3.1% -2.4% -0.6% 
Educational Attainment               
No high school degree -17.2% -13.6% -10.4% -19.8% -17.5% -14.7% -9.9% 
Some college 10.1% 7.0% 5.0% 12.9% 9.7% 7.4% 4.7% 
BA degree or more 12.8% 8.9% 6.3% 18.3% 13.5% 10.1% 5.8% 
Race/Ethnicity               
Black -6.6% -4.9% -3.7% -2.8% -2.3% -1.8% -5.5% 
Hispanic -6.7% -5.0% -3.7% -4.4% -3.6% -2.9% -5.9% 
Other -8.5% -6.4% -4.8% -6.9% -5.7% -4.5% -5.3% 
Marital Status               
Divorced 5.5% 3.9% 2.8% 10.9% 8.3% 6.3% 1.7% 
Other, spouse absent -4.1% -3.0% -2.2% 1.1% 0.9% 0.7% -4.5% 
 
 
2.6 Analysis of Policy and Economic Variables 
 
One of main ways that scholars have analyzed the effect of policy changes on 
single mother employment rates is by using the results of their regression models to 
simulate what would have happened if certain policy and economic variables had not 
changed. For example, one can use a model’s regression coefficients to simulate what 
the employment rate for a given group would be in 1999 if EITC policies would have 
stayed constant at 1992 levels. Under such a simulation, the difference between what 
was originally predicted by the model using actual data and what is predicted by 
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holding EITC policies at 1992 levels provides an estimate of how much of the change 
in employment was due to EITC policy changes.  
I ran simulations for two time periods; 1992-1999 and 1999-2007. I chose to 
do 1992-1999 because employment for single mothers with a high school degree or 
less education increased by 20.2 percentage points during that period and peaked in 
1999. Understanding whether that rise in employment was due to EITC expansions, 
AFDC/TANF changes or the economy continues to be policy relevant today. Many 
policy makers who propose TANF-like reforms for other safety net programs cite the 
rise of single mother employment rates during the 1990s as a reason to do them. I 
chose to analyze 1999-2007 because single mothers with a high school degree or less 
education decreased their employment by 7.3 percentage points during that period. I 
ended my simulation in 2007 because I wanted to look at the period before the Great 
Recession. It’s well established that employment rates across the entire labor force 
dropped due to the Great Recession, but it’s less understood what led to the drop in 
single mother employment between 1999 and 2007.  
In order to interpret my simulation results, it’s important to know what the 
levels of the policy and economic variables were at the beginning and end of the 
periods covered by the simulations. Table 2.6 shows the employment rates, and the 
levels of the policy and economic variables faced by single mothers with a high 
school degree or less education in 1992, 1999, and 2007 and how they changed 
between 1992-1999 and 1999-2007. Between 1992 and 1999 mean simulated EITC 
increased by $1,008, simulated AFDC/TANF declined by $635, and state 
unemployment rates declined by 3.3 percentage points. All three of these reflect 
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pretty substantial changes over that period. In contrast, the simulated SNAP variable 
declined by only $184 between 1992 and 1999.   
Table 2.6: Employment Rates, Safety Net Policies and State Unemployment 
Rates Faced by Single Mothers with a High School Degree or Less Education, 
1992-2007  
  
Mean values  Differences 
1992 1999 2007 1992-1999 1999-2007 
Percent Employed 65.1% 85.3% 78.0% 20.2% -7.3% 
Simulated mean EITC $967 $1,975 $1,966 $1,008 -$9 
Simulated mean AFDC/TANF 1598 963 583 -$635 -$380 
Simulated mean SNAP $1,231 $1,047 $1,420 -$184 $373 
State unemployment rate 7.6 4.3 4.6 -3.3 0.3 
 
The CPS data shows that between 1992 and 1999 employment rates for single 
mothers with a high school degree or less education increased by 20.2 percent. That 
compares to a 19.3 percentage point increase predicted by my model. Table 2.7 
provides the simulation results from using my model to predict employment levels 




Table 2.7: Simulation Results of Employment Levels for Single Mothers, High 
School Degree or Less Education, 1992-1999  
Predicted Employment in 1999 if the 










State unemployment 65.4% 80.7% 15.3% 3.9% 20% 
Mean simulated EITC 65.4% 77.6% 12.2% 7.0% 36% 
Mean simulated TANF 65.4% 82.6% 17.3% 2.0% 10% 
Mean simulated SNAP 65.4% 84.0% 18.6% 0.7% 4% 
All of above stayed at 1992 levels 65.4% 70.8% 5.5% 13.8% 72% 
Baseline Scenario predicted by model:  
None of above stayed at 1992 levels 
65.4% 84.6% 19.3%     
Actual CPS employment trend: 65.1% 85.3% 20.2%     
 
For example, table 2.7 shows that if state unemployment rates had stayed at 
1992 levels, single mothers with a high school education or less education would 
have increased their employment level by 15.3 percentage points. (See top line, 4th 
column in table 2.7.) Instead, they increased their employment level by 19.3 
percentage points. This means that changes in state unemployment rates were 
responsible for a 3.9 percentage point increase in single mother employment. 7  This 
3.9 percentage point increase accounts for 20 percent of the total 19.3 percentage 
point increase in employment predicted by my model between 1992 and 1999. 
In terms of policy variables, changes in the EITC between 1992 and 1999 
seem to be the most important. They account for 36 percent of the 1992-1999 
increase in employment levels. TANF policy changes account for 10 percent of the 
employment increase and SNAP policy changes account for 4 percent. Together, 
changes in state unemployment rates and the three policy variables explain 72 percent 
of the total variation captured by the model. I chose 1999 as the end point of these 
                                                 
7 19.3-15.3 = 3.9 when using unrounded figures. 
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simulations because 1999 was the peak employment year for single mothers with a 
high school degree or less education.  
As I discussed in my literature review, only a handful of studies (Meyer & 
Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003; Fang & Keane, 2004; Looney, 2005; Noonan, 
Smith & Corcoran, 2007) have tried to explicitly compare the impact of welfare 
reform on single mother employment relative to the impact of the economy and other 
policy reforms such as changes to the EITC and AFDC/TANF. In order to test the 
accuracy of my model simulations, it is instructive to compare my results to previous 
scholars. Table 2.8 shows that my simulation results for the 1992-1999 period are 
broadly consistent with the findings from the literature.  
Table 2.8: Comparison to Earlier Literature: Percent of Single Mother 
Employment Change Explained by Various Factors 
  Years Economy AFDC/TANF EITC Other 
Grogger 2003 1993-1999 21 20 34 26 
Fang and Keane 2004 1993-2000 40 19 20 21 
Looney 2005 1993-1999 17 37 22 24 
Noonan et al. 2007 1991-2000 7 14 19 60 
Average of four above:   21 24 24 33 
My Results 1992-1999 20 10 36 33 
 
The biggest difference is that my model seems to attribute more responsibility 
to EITC changes and less responsibility to AFDC/TANF changes than the four earlier 
studies. Table 2.9 provides a summary of how my analysis differs from the four 
earlier studies. These methodological differences can provide some clues to why 
estimates differed across studies.  
The main difference between Looney (2005) and the rest of the analyses, 
including my own, is that Looney (2005) used monthly data from the Survey of 
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Income and Program Participation (SIPP) instead of annual data from the March 
Current Population Survey (CPS). Relative to my analysis and the other three studies, 
Looney (2005) finds less of an effect of the economy and more of an effect of welfare 
reform policies on the employment of single mothers. Looney (2005) argues that 
studies examining annual data may overestimate the effects of the economy and 
underestimate the effects of Welfare Reform policies.  
My model found that the economy accounted for 20 percent of the 
employment increase of single mothers with a high school degree or less education. 
This came very close to the 21 percent found by Grogger and the 17 percent found by 
Looney. In contrast, Fang and Keane found that the economy accounted for 40 
percent and Noonan et al. found that it accounted for 7 percent of the employment 
increase. Like Grogger, I only used the state unemployment rates to measure the 
economy. However, the other three papers used some additional variables to measure 
the economy such as wage levels, and the share of low skill jobs. When available, 
Looney and Noonan used unemployment rates of smaller geographic areas, 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, instead of states. It’s surprising that Looney attributes 
close to the same amount of responsibility to the economy as Grogger and I do even 
though he used a fairly different approach to measuring the economy. (See Table 2.9) 
Therefore, it seems like the differences across the papers in how much is attributed to 
the economy are likely driven by other methodological decisions besides how the 













Noonan et al.  
2007 
Data set March CPS data 
for 1980-2012 
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and state policy 
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welfare with severity of 
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skill jobs with 
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low-skill jobs with 





In terms of measuring the EITC, my analysis and most of the papers followed 
a similar approach that accounted for the amount of EITC that families with different 
numbers of children were eligible for. Like when trying to measure the effects of the 
economy, my simulations of the effect of the EITC seemed to match Grogger the 
best. I found that the EITC accounted for 36 percent of the employment increase of 
single mothers while Grogger found that the EITC accounted for 34 percent. The 
other three studies found that the EITC accounted for 19-22 percent of the 
employment increase. Given that the EITC was measured in a similar way across 
studies, I think the differences found in how much the EITC affected single mother 
employment were likely due to other methodological decisions besides the creation of 
the EITC variables.  
My analysis differed the most from the other four studies in how I measured 
AFDC/TANF changes. As I explained in Chapter 1, I believe that my measure of 
AFDC/TANF changes that is based on a simulated variable that captures changes in 
benefit levels and accessibility across states and time is superior to approaches that 
use dummy variables to mark the implementation of policy changes. The other four 
papers do include the maximum state AFDC/TANF benefit in their models, but they 
do not make any adjustments for differences in how accessibility to TANF changed 
across states or time. As I discussed in Chapter 1, there is a lot of variation by state 
and time in accessibility as revealed by the TANF-to-Poverty ratio. Using my 
AFDC/TANF variable, my simulations find that AFDC/TANF changes were 
responsible for 10 percent of the increase in single mother employment. This comes 
closest to the 14 percent found by Noonan et al. In contrast, Looney found that 
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AFDC/TANF changes accounted for 37 percent. Grogger found that AFDC/TANF 
changes accounted for 20 percent while Fang and Keane found that they accounted 
for 19 percent of the increase in single mother employment. I need to do additional 
research to determine whether the differences between my results and those of the 
other papers were due to how I measured AFDC/TANF or because of other 
methodological differences between our models. As shown in Table 2.9, my model 
differed considerably from the other models in terms of what other policy variables 
and interaction terms were included. In order to test whether my AFDC/TANF made 
the difference, I would need to recreate the AFDC/TANF measures used in the other 
papers, apply them to my model, and see how they change my AFDC/TANF 
predictions. It would also be instructive to do a more complete replication study and 
go step-by-step through each of the other methodological differences between my 
paper and the other papers and observe what drives differences in the predictions.  
Table 2.10 provides the simulation calculations from my model for the 1999-
2007 period. My model explains much less of the 1999-2007 decline of single mother 
employment compared to how much my model explained the 1992-1999 employment 
increase. Changes in my state unemployment and three policy variables only explain 
15 percent of the 1999-2007 drop in employment. My EITC variable and state 
unemployment rates account for almost no change in the employment rate of single 
mothers with a high school education or less between 1999 and 2007. That’s not 
surprising given that state unemployment rates and the EITC were almost the same in 
2007 compared with 1999. TANF continued to decline between 1999-2007, but not as 
much as it did during the 1992-1999 period. (See Table 2.6). My SNAP variable 
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increased during the 1999-2007 period, but only accounted for a 1.7 percentage point 
decline in the employment rate of single mothers with a high school education or less.  
Table 2.10: Simulation Results of Employment Levels for Single Mothers, High 
School Degree or Less Education, 1999-2007   
Predicted Employment in 2007 if the 










State unemployment 84.6% 78.7% -5.9% -0.4% 6% 
Mean simulated EITC 84.6% 78.5% -6.1% -0.2% 4% 
Mean simulated TANF 84.6% 77.0% -7.7% 1.3% -21% 
Mean simulated SNAP 84.6% 80.0% -4.6% -1.7% 27% 
All of above stayed at 1999 levels 84.6% 79.3% -5.4% -1.0% 15% 
Baseline Scenario predicted by model:  
None of above stayed at 1999 levels 
84.6% 78.3% -6.3%     
Actual CPS employment trend: 85.3% 78.0% -7.3%     
 
It’s not that surprising that my model doesn’t explain much of the single 
mother employment decline over the 1999-2007 period given that there was a secular 
decline in employment among various groups during that period. The causes behind 
that secular decline in employment are still not well understood by scholars. Relevant 
to this discussion is the fact that the employment rate for single women between the 
ages of 25 and 45 not raising children and with a high school education or less 
declined by 3.7 percentage points between 1999 and 2007. That compares to the 5.9 
percentage point drop in employment for single mothers with the same education 
level and within the same age group8. Single women not raising children is a group 
that relies very little on safety net benefits. Therefore, this leads me to think that there 
is something about the economy that is driving at least half of this downward 
                                                 
8 I restricted this comparison to single women between the ages of 25 and 45 to make the single 




employment trend for both single women raising and not raising children. My model 
could benefit from adding more variables to better measure the characteristics of a 
changing labor market such as wage levels and the share of low skill jobs. In addition, 
I could structure my analysis to focus on the difference in employment rates between 
single women raising and not raising children. Such a difference-in-difference 
approach could help to isolate the effects of changes in the safety net from other 
changes in the economy.  
2.9 Conclusion 
 
Many policy makers point to the increase in employment of single mothers 
during the 1990s as one of the major achievements of the 1996 welfare law. This 
paper first looked into how employment changes differed between single women with 
various characteristics using descriptive analysis. Secondly, it looked at how policy 
and economic factors affected the employment increase of single mothers between 
1992 and 1999 and the employment decline between 1999 and 2007 using 
econometric techniques.  
The descriptive analysis shows that employment among single mothers 18-54 
years old increased by 15 percentage points from 1992 to 2000 while the employment 
rate of 18-54 year old single women without children stayed flat. Single mothers 
increased their employment more than comparable single women without children 
between 1992-2000 across all ages, race/ethnicity, education level, and marital status 
groups. However, since 2000, both single mothers and single women without children 
have decreased their employment levels. Another pattern that can be observed from 
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the descriptive analysis is that those single mothers with the lowest employment 
levels in 1992 increased their employment the most between 1992 and 2000. Single 
mothers with the least educational attainment and those with the youngest children 
increased their employment the most between 1992 and 2000.  
The econometric analysis confirmed previous research showing that EITC 
policy changes and the great economy during the 1990s combined to be more 
important for the increase in employment of single mothers than the changes in 
AFDC/TANF assistance. It finds that the EITC accounted for 42 percent of the 
employment increase among single mothers with a high school education or less 
between 1992 and 2000. The economy accounted for 25 percent, changes in cash 
assistance accounted for 13 percent, and SNAP changes accounted for 6 percent. This 
confirmation of the findings of previous research is notable given that the 
econometric analysis in this paper used more years of data and measures for TANF, 
SNAP and the EITC that differ from previous researchers. This paper used a measure 
of TANF, SNAP, and EITC policies that capture in dollar terms using a consistent 
methodology how access and benefit levels have changed over time by state and by 
family size. 
In future research, I would like to further improve my model and my policy 
variables. I would like to test out whether including additional policy or economic 
variables will improve my model. Based on my descriptive data analysis showing 
how single mother employment trends differed by the age of the youngest child, the 
availability of child care subsidies seems important to include as a policy variable. In 
terms of economic variables, I would like to investigate whether controlling for state 
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median income and state wages at the 25th percentile like other studies have done 
would make a difference in my model. There a number of refinements that I could 
make to the creation of my TANF and SNAP policy variables. These improvements 
include simulating benefits in a more detailed way such as taking into account 
earnings disregards when simulating TANF benefits. I would also like to test out 
whether my results would be different if I used one of the other six measures I 
developed in my first chapter.  
An important caveat of my findings so far is that I have only analyzed whether 
someone worked during the year and not how many hours they worked or at what 
wage. It would be important to know, for example, whether the increase in 
employment among single mothers with very young children consisted of just a few 
hours at low pay or enough to greatly improve their economic well-being. The next 
chapter tries to address the question of how economic well-being changed for families 
with children over the 1993-2012 period.  
My long term research goal is to use the policy variables I developed and the 
econometric techniques I used in this paper to try to also explain income, poverty and 
deep poverty trends. The end goal would be to construct a set of models that could 
illustrate for policymakers using historical data the potential tradeoffs that exist when 
adopting new safety net policies. For example, the models could try to show in 
numerical terms what the effect of a decline in SNAP would be in terms of potentially 
increasing single mother employment and also potentially increasing deep poverty 




Appendix Table 2.1: Regression Coefficients for Logistic Model Predicting Any 
Employment During the Year 
Number of observations 571,887 
Pseudo R2 0.1804 
This table reports standard errors clustered at the state level.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 
       
Number of children and their age       
No children (Omitted)       
one child,  0-3 years old -1.6077 0.1540 -10.44 0.000 
one child, 4-7 years old -0.9240 0.1713 -5.39 0.000 
one child, 8-17 years old -0.4124 0.1816 -2.27 0.023 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 -1.7190 0.1778 -9.67 0.000 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 -1.0322 0.1971 -5.24 0.000 
2+ children, youngest is 8-17 -0.5423 0.2171 -2.50 0.012 
       
Own Age       
18-24 (Omitted)       
25-34 -0.4607 0.0753 -6.12 0.000 
35-44 -0.3785 0.0727 -5.21 0.000 
45-54 -0.4617 0.1179 -3.92 0.000 
       
Educational Attainment       
Less than a high school degree (Omitted)       
High school degree only 0.8886 0.0755 11.77 0.000 
Some college, No BA degree 1.7998 0.0776 23.21 0.000 
BA degree or more 2.2028 0.1354 16.27 0.000 
       
Race/Ethnicity       
White (Omitted)       
Black -0.3753 0.0697 -5.38 0.000 
Hispanic -1.0301 0.0890 -11.57 0.000 
Other -0.8243 0.1149 -7.17 0.000 
       
Marital Status       
Divorced (Omitted)       
Never married -0.2532 0.0734 -3.45 0.001 
Other, spouse absent -0.8905 0.0573 -15.55 0.000 
       
Economy       
State unemployment -0.1196 0.0163 -7.33 0.000 
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Policy       
Simulated EITC -0.0049 0.0017 -2.84 0.005 
Simulated TANF -0.0003 0.0001 -4.54 0.000 
Simulated SNAP -0.0014 0.0004 -3.86 0.000 
       
Unemployment#Children       
one child,  0-3 years old 0.0294 0.0155 1.90 0.057 
one child, 4-7 years old 0.0354 0.0193 1.83 0.067 
one child, 8-17 years old 0.0187 0.0174 1.08 0.281 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 0.0561 0.0218 2.57 0.010 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 0.0469 0.0244 1.93 0.054 
2+ children, youngest is 8-17 0.0552 0.0247 2.24 0.025 
       
Unemployment#Age       
25-34 0.0300 0.0127 2.37 0.018 
35-44 0.0176 0.0130 1.35 0.177 
45-54 0.0173 0.0179 0.97 0.333 
       
Unemployment#Education       
High school degree only 0.0041 0.0116 0.35 0.725 
Some college, No BA degree 0.0057 0.0100 0.57 0.569 
BA degree or more 0.0039 0.0228 0.17 0.864 
       
Unemployment#Race       
Black -0.0363 0.0076 -4.77 0.000 
Hispanic 0.0638 0.0102 6.27 0.000 
Other 0.0364 0.0159 2.28 0.022 
       
Unemployment#Marital       
Never married 0.0032 0.0100 0.32 0.746 
Other, spouse absent 0.0223 0.0074 3.03 0.002 
       
EITC#Children       
one child,  0-3 years old 0.0053 0.0016 3.29 0.001 
one child, 4-7 years old 0.0054 0.0016 3.35 0.001 
one child, 8-17 years old 0.0053 0.0016 3.32 0.001 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 0.0053 0.0017 3.16 0.002 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 0.0052 0.0017 3.16 0.002 
2+ children, youngest is 8-17 0.0052 0.0017 3.12 0.002 
       
EITC#Age       
25-34 0.0001 0.0000 3.38 0.001 
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35-44 0.0001 0.0001 2.71 0.007 
45-54 0.0001 0.0001 1.00 0.315 
       
EITC#Education       
High school degree only -0.0001 0.0000 -2.20 0.028 
Some college, No BA degree -0.0002 0.0000 -4.96 0.000 
BA degree or more -0.0003 0.0001 -4.36 0.000 
       
EITC#Race       
Black 0.0001 0.0000 4.10 0.000 
Hispanic 0.0002 0.0001 2.64 0.008 
Other 0.0000 0.0001 0.76 0.445 
       
EITC#Marital       
Never married 0.0000 0.0000 0.51 0.612 
Other, spouse absent 0.0001 0.0000 1.87 0.062 
       
TANF#Children       
one child,  0-3 years old 0.0001 0.0001 1.97 0.049 
one child, 4-7 years old 0.0000 0.0000 -0.36 0.719 
one child, 8-17 years old 0.0000 0.0000 1.37 0.169 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 0.0000 0.0000 -0.02 0.987 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 0.0000 0.0000 -0.66 0.509 
2+ children, youngest is 8-17 (Omitted)       
       
TANF#Age       
25-34 0.0001 0.0000 5.58 0.000 
35-44 0.0001 0.0000 6.12 0.000 
45-54 0.0001 0.0000 3.31 0.001 
       
TANF#Education       
High school degree only 0.0000 0.0000 1.90 0.057 
Some college, No BA degree 0.0000 0.0000 1.30 0.193 
BA degree or more 0.0000 0.0000 -0.42 0.672 
       
TANF#Race       
Black 0.0000 0.0000 -0.01 0.993 
Hispanic 0.0000 0.0001 0.46 0.646 
Other 0.0000 0.0000 -1.00 0.318 
       
TANF#Marital       
Never married -0.0001 0.0000 -5.83 0.000 
Other, spouse absent 0.0001 0.0000 3.75 0.000 
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SNAP#Children       
one child,  0-3 years old 0.0009 0.0003 3.19 0.001 
one child, 4-7 years old 0.0006 0.0003 1.96 0.050 
one child, 8-17 years old 0.0007 0.0003 2.61 0.009 
2+ children, youngest is 0-3 0.0007 0.0003 2.20 0.028 
2+ children, youngest is 4-7 0.0007 0.0003 2.08 0.038 
2+ children, youngest is 8-17 0.0006 0.0003 2.02 0.043 
       
SNAP#Age       
25-34 0.0000 0.0000 0.49 0.627 
35-44 0.0000 0.0000 0.19 0.852 
45-54 0.0000 0.0001 0.57 0.569 
       
SNAP#Education       
High school degree only 0.0000 0.0000 0.12 0.905 
Some college, No BA degree -0.0001 0.0000 -2.29 0.022 
BA degree or more 0.0001 0.0001 0.98 0.325 
       
SNAP#Race       
Black 0.0001 0.0000 5.04 0.000 
Hispanic 0.0000 0.0001 0.05 0.958 
Other 0.0002 0.0001 2.27 0.023 
       
SNAP#Marital       
Never married -0.0001 0.0000 -2.69 0.007 
Other, spouse absent 0.0000 0.0000 1.24 0.215 
       
Unemployment#EITC 0.0000 0.0000 -2.36 0.019 
       
Unemployment#TANF 0.0000 0.0000 -2.05 0.040 
       
Unemployment#SNAP 0.0000 0.0000 1.93 0.054 
       
EITC#TANF 0.0000 0.0000 -1.28 0.200 
       
EITC#SNAP 0.0000 0.0000 3.35 0.001 
       
TANF#SNAP 0.0000 0.0000 2.36 0.018 
       
Year        
1980 (Omitted)       
1981 0.0150 0.0354 0.42 0.672 
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1982 0.0101 0.0543 0.19 0.852 
1983 -0.0383 0.0464 -0.83 0.409 
1984 -0.0460 0.0442 -1.04 0.298 
1985 -0.0470 0.0437 -1.07 0.283 
1986 -0.0403 0.0411 -0.98 0.326 
1987 -0.0513 0.0389 -1.32 0.188 
1988 -0.0779 0.0465 -1.67 0.094 
1989 -0.0906 0.0526 -1.72 0.085 
1990 -0.0575 0.0511 -1.13 0.260 
1991 -0.0672 0.0456 -1.47 0.140 
1992 -0.0829 0.0523 -1.59 0.113 
1993 -0.0795 0.0590 -1.35 0.178 
1994 -0.0010 0.1015 -0.01 0.992 
1995 -0.0258 0.1233 -0.21 0.834 
1996 -0.0349 0.1301 -0.27 0.789 
1997 -0.0392 0.1235 -0.32 0.751 
1998 -0.0030 0.1313 -0.02 0.982 
1999 0.1341 0.1314 1.02 0.307 
2000 0.0269 0.1313 0.21 0.838 
2001 -0.0905 0.1212 -0.75 0.455 
2002 -0.0881 0.1228 -0.72 0.473 
2003 -0.0657 0.1087 -0.60 0.545 
2004 -0.1402 0.1177 -1.19 0.234 
2005 -0.2043 0.1127 -1.81 0.070 
2006 -0.1706 0.1188 -1.44 0.151 
2007 -0.1890 0.1276 -1.48 0.138 
2008 -0.1409 0.1196 -1.18 0.239 
2009 -0.1093 0.1264 -0.87 0.387 
2010 -0.0935 0.1238 -0.76 0.450 
2011 -0.0610 0.1231 -0.50 0.620 
2012 -0.0712 0.1169 -0.61 0.542 
       
State       
Alabama (Omitted)       
Alaska 0.8337 0.0497 16.77 0.000 
Arizona 0.0100 0.0214 0.47 0.641 
Arkansas 0.0988 0.0127 7.76 0.000 
California 0.2310 0.0727 3.18 0.001 
Colorado 0.2981 0.0230 12.98 0.000 
Connecticut 0.4570 0.0577 7.92 0.000 
Delaware 0.4616 0.0197 23.43 0.000 
District Of Columbia 0.5880 0.0321 18.32 0.000 
Florida 0.1668 0.0130 12.79 0.000 
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Georgia 0.2276 0.0091 24.91 0.000 
Hawaii 0.4667 0.0909 5.14 0.000 
Idaho 0.1393 0.0327 4.26 0.000 
Illinois 0.1848 0.0146 12.66 0.000 
Indiana 0.1611 0.0201 8.02 0.000 
Iowa 0.4547 0.0309 14.72 0.000 
Kansas 0.4142 0.0312 13.25 0.000 
Kentucky 0.0552 0.0182 3.04 0.002 
Louisiana -0.0472 0.0075 -6.30 0.000 
Maine 0.2154 0.0296 7.27 0.000 
Maryland 0.3828 0.0181 21.19 0.000 
Massachusetts 0.2121 0.0379 5.59 0.000 
Michigan 0.3349 0.0225 14.86 0.000 
Minnesota 0.5494 0.0321 17.12 0.000 
Mississippi 0.1540 0.0148 10.43 0.000 
Missouri 0.3690 0.0161 22.97 0.000 
Montana 0.0688 0.0312 2.20 0.028 
Nebraska 0.3762 0.0352 10.69 0.000 
Nevada 0.2479 0.0270 9.19 0.000 
New Hampshire 0.3515 0.0369 9.51 0.000 
New Jersey 0.1271 0.0276 4.60 0.000 
New Mexico 0.1117 0.0275 4.05 0.000 
New York -0.0440 0.0426 -1.03 0.302 
North Carolina 0.2853 0.0128 22.25 0.000 
North Dakota 0.2210 0.0398 5.55 0.000 
Ohio 0.2781 0.0157 17.74 0.000 
Oklahoma 0.1463 0.0198 7.39 0.000 
Oregon 0.2954 0.0252 11.71 0.000 
Pennsylvania 0.1630 0.0186 8.78 0.000 
Rhode Island 0.4098 0.0380 10.77 0.000 
South Carolina 0.2872 0.0054 52.73 0.000 
South Dakota 0.3520 0.0357 9.86 0.000 
Tennessee 0.2173 0.0063 34.61 0.000 
Texas 0.3024 0.0136 22.27 0.000 
Utah 0.1585 0.0339 4.68 0.000 
Vermont 0.3171 0.0397 7.98 0.000 
Virginia 0.3227 0.0198 16.29 0.000 
Washington 0.3320 0.0265 12.55 0.000 
West Virginia -0.3164 0.0274 -11.56 0.000 
Wisconsin 0.6572 0.0331 19.83 0.000 
Wyoming 0.4276 0.0307 13.91 0.000 
       
_cons  3.0156 0.1242 24.29 0.000 
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Chapter 3: From Welfare Reform to the Great Recession: 
How has the level and composition of income changed for 




Over the last two decades the safety net for families with children has gone 
through some significant changes. During the early 1990s the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) was expanded. The maximum EITC that a working single mother with 
two children could receive increased from $1,511 in 1993 to a $3,556 in 1996. Later 
legislation and automatic adjustments by inflation increased the maximum available 
EITC for a working single mother of two to $5,236 in 2012. The Child Tax Credit 
(CTC) was enacted in 1997 and during its first year a family could receive a $400 per 
child annual credit. Subsequent legislation made it so that starting in 2003 a family 
could receive a credit of up to $1,000 per child. The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 made major changes to 
safety net programs. The act replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program with a block grant program called the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF). The law ended the entitlement of poor families to assistance 
from the federal government, instituted a five-year time limit on federal cash benefits, 
imposed stronger work requirements on recipients and devolved most details of 
welfare policy making to the fifty states. Along with other changes, it also restricted 
the eligibility of legal residents to safety net benefits and modified the benefits and 
eligibility requirements in the Food Stamp Program. Between, 1997 and 2012, the 
TANF caseload declined by 50 percent. The Supplemental Nutrition Program (SNAP, 
formerly called the Food Stamp Program) caseload declined between 1996 and 2000 
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by 33 percent. Between 2000 and 2007 the SNAP caseload increased by 53 percent 
due to the weakening of the economy and bipartisan efforts at the federal and state 
level to streamline paperwork requirements and change eligibility rules so that 
families could still qualify for aid if they owned a certain amount of assets such as a 
modest car for commuting to work. From 2007 and 2012 the SNAP caseload 
increased by 77 percent due to the impact of the Great Recession and increased 
participation among the eligible population.   
The 1996 welfare reform law generated a great number of research studies. 
Rebecca Blank wrote a review of the literature in 2002 and in 2009. Jeffrey Grogger 
and Lynn A. Karoly did a synthesis of the literature in 2002 and a meta-analysis in 
2005. In total, these four publications reviewed over 70 non-experimental 
econometric studies that aimed to establish a causal link between welfare policy 
reforms and various outcome variables such as welfare use, employment, earnings, 
income, poverty, hardship, marriage, childbearing, and child outcomes. About half of 
the studies focused on understanding changes in welfare use and one fourth focused 
on employment outcomes. Surprisingly, only four of all of the studies reviewed by 
these publications used poverty as a dependent variable and six used total family 
income.  
These econometric studies generally found that welfare reform had an impact 
both on declines in welfare participation and on increases in work effort, although the 
magnitude of this effect varies across studies. As summarized by Grogger and 
Karoly’s meta-analysis (2005), most studies found that welfare reform as a whole was 
responsible for a 20 percent decline in welfare caseloads and a 4 percent increase in 
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the employment of single mothers. On average, the increase in employment led to an 
increase in earnings that outweighed the loss of TANF benefits, and therefore poverty 
rates went down.  
Grogger and Karoly lament that most of these studies considered only family 
income before taxes and exclusive of non-cash benefits such as SNAP and housing 
assistance. They also pointed out that underreporting of benefits may bias results. One 
of the key contributions of this paper is to use an income measure that counts the 
impact of taxes, non-cash benefits, and corrects for the underreporting of SNAP, 
TANF, and SSI benefits.  
One of the weaknesses of many of these studies is that they focus on average 
effects, and do not account for the possibility that welfare reform policies could have 
heterogeneous effects. Using random assignment data from Connecticut’s Jobs First 
waiver, Bitler et al. (2006) found that average effects miss a great deal of variation 
that exists between different parts of the income distribution. They concluded that 
welfare reform’s effects are likely both more varied and more extensive than has been 
recognized. The possibility of heterogeneous effects is further supported by 
researchers that have found that after 1996 some families increased their income to 
put them above the poverty line, yet another group of families saw their income drop 
below half the poverty (also known as deep poverty). Yonatan Ben-Shalom, Robert 
A. Moffitt, and John Karl Scholz (2011) analyzed poverty trends using the Survey of 
Program Participation (SIPP) and a poverty measure that counts non-cash public 
benefits like SNAP and tax provisions like the EITC. They found that while the 
poverty rate declined from 15.3 percent in 1984 to 13.5 percent in 2004, the deep 
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poverty rate rose from 4.5 percent to 6.6 percent.  Ben-Shalom et al. (2011) attribute 
at least part of the increase of deep poverty to a decline in cash assistance for the very 
poor and a general shifting of the safety net away from those with the lowest incomes 
to those with incomes closer to the poverty line. Sherman and Trisi (2015) reached a 
similar conclusion using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1995-2010 and 
a more comprehensive measure of poverty that included non-cash and tax benefits, 
and deducted medical and work expenses such as child care, and made corrections for 
underreported benefit income. They found that although poverty rates fell from 1995 
to 2005, deep poverty rose due to a weakening of the safety net, particularly TANF. 
They found that in 1995, AFDC lifted 61 percent of children who would otherwise 
have been below half of the poverty line out of deep poverty. By 2005, this figure for 
TANF was just 22 percent. 
Primus et al. (1999) were one of the few studies that analyzed the impact of 
welfare reform at various points in the income distribution. They examined changes 
in the income of female-headed households in the periods 1993-1995 and 1995-1997. 
Using an income measure that counts food stamps, housing subsidies, the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and other such benefits as income, they found that between 1993 
and 1995 the disposable income of single mother families rose broadly and 
substantially. However, they found that between 1995 and 1997, the average 
disposable income of the poorest fifth and poorest 10th of single mother families fell 
mainly due to a drop in cash-assistance and food stamp benefits that substantially 
exceeded the decline in need.  
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Bollinger, Gonzalez, and Ziliak (2009) improved on many of the previous 
studies by analyzing the impact of welfare reform on the incomes of single mothers 
not only at the mean, but at various quintiles. They found that TANF raised 
disposable incomes an average of eight percent among higher skilled mothers, and 
raised earnings among low skilled mothers in the lower half of the distribution by as 
much as 20 percent, but that it also resulted in a significant equal-size loss of after-tax 
total income among the low-skilled. They conclude that “the earnings gains among 
the low skilled a decade after the implementation of TANF and expansions of the 
EITC have been more than offset by losses in transfer income and have left the most 
vulnerable single mothers either running in place or falling behind.”  
This paper aims to contribute to this string of the literature by dividing 
children into twenty equal groups (ventiles) ranked by their family’s private income. 
The paper will analyze how the level and composition of income of children in each 
ventile changed between 1993 and 2012. Being able to cover the Great Recession, 
which officially lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, and its aftermath is another 
important contribution of this paper. A number of studies have shown how spending 
on most major social programs increased significantly during the Great Recession to 
help families make up the  loss in earnings. (Ziliak 2011; Burtless and Gordon 2011; 
Moffitt 2013; Bitler and Hoynes 2016). The Congressional Budget Office (2016) 
recently published the latest version of their report on the distribution of household 
income and federal taxes which uses a comprehensive income measure that includes 
government transfers. However, none of these studies break down the increases of 
safety net spending by ventiles of families with children. This paper will demonstrate 
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how important it is to look at ventiles instead of quintiles because of how different 
trends can be for the bottom 5 percent of children compared to the next 5 percent. The 
ventiles analysis allows one to see how economic wellbeing and the reach of safety 
net programs have changed within the bottom quintile of the income distribution. In 
addition, this paper will analyze the characteristics of children and their families at 
different points of the income distribution in 2012.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
Like many previous researchers, I have chosen to use the Annual Social & 
Economic Supplement (ASEC) from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
commonly known as the March CPS. The CPS microdata which is publicly available 
provides information on labor market participation, family structure, demographics, 
receipt of government benefits, and many other variables. The March CPS sample 
size currently stands at about 100,000 households per year. (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010).  
Similarly to other household surveys, the CPS suffers from some 
underreporting of income and benefits. The total amount of government benefits that 
people report receiving in the CPS falls short of the actual figures according to 
administrative data. Changes in the degree of underreporting over time could be 
particularly problematic for time series analyses. (Wheaton, 2007) One way to 
address this issue is to augment CPS data using a microsimulation model that corrects 
for underreporting. Sherman and Trisi (2015) use this approach, and that’s also my 
approach here. I correct for the tendency of CPS data to underreport income from 
three government assistance programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
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(TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). To make these corrections, I use 
baseline data from the Transfer Income Model Version III (TRIM III) policy micro-
simulation model developed by the Urban Institute under contract with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation. TRIM starts with Census survey data but uses a different method of 
filling in questions skipped by survey respondents regarding program participation 
and benefit income, in order to closely match actual numbers and characteristics of 
benefit recipients shown in administrative records. The problem of underreporting of 
AFDC/TANF cash assistance has gotten worse over time. The CPS data captured 77 
percent of AFDC spending in 1993 but only 48 percent of TANF spending in 2012. 
However, TRIM corrections can help fix this problem. The CPS data augmented by 
TRIM captures 93 percent of AFDC spending in 1993 and 91 percent of TANF 
spending in 2012. This analysis ends with 2012 because that’s the latest year for 
which TRIM underreporting corrections are available for SNAP, TANF and SSI. 
Instead of analyzing poverty rates and deep poverty rates of children, this 
paper will analyze the mean family income of ventiles of children. Ventiles are 
created by ranking all children by their family’s size adjusted private income and 
dividing them into 20 equal groups. I adjusted for family size using the same 
methodology that the Congressional Budget Office uses in their studies of household 
income. (See CBO 2016). I adjust for family size by dividing family income by the 
square root of the number of people in the family, counting adults and children 
equally. This adjustment implies that each additional person increases a family’s 
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needs but does so at a decreasing rate. This is done to take into account for the fact 
that larger families need more total income but less per capita income than smaller 
families because they can share resources and take advantage of economies of scale. 
All the mean income figures that I present in this paper are equivalent to a family of 
four.   
Private income consists of labor income, business income, and other non-
government sources of income such as private pensions, interest income, and rental 
income. In this paper, I use private income and pre-government income 
interchangeably. For children in the bottom half of the family private income 
distribution, earnings made up 94 percent of the total private income in 1993-2012. 
Therefore, in this paper I use the private income distribution, the pre-government 
income distribution and the earnings distribution interchangeably. The CBO uses the 
term market income instead of private income in its household income study. For the 
next iteration of this paper, I’m going to consider whether I should use market income 
instead of private income to be consistent with their terminology.  
Families are defined using the same methodology that the Census Bureau uses 
to calculate the official poverty measure. A family is defined as two or more people 
living together and related to each other by birth, marriage or adoption. Under this 
definition unmarried partners are not considered part of the same family unit. All 
mean income figures presented are in 2012 dollars adjusted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers Research Series (CPI-U-
RS). This is the same series that the Census Bureau uses to adjust for inflation in its 
annual poverty and income reports.  
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
The first step in my analysis is to rank all children by their family’s size 
adjusted private income and divide them into 20 equal groups (ventiles). Figure 3.1 
shows the mean private income of each ventile. Each ventile consists of roughly 
about 3.6 million children. 
Figure 3.1: Mean Private Income of Ventiles of Children in 2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Figure 3.1 is dominated by the relatively high income of the top 5 percent 
ventile ($345,900). The mean income of the top 5 percent would be even higher if I 
used another data set that fully captured the income of that group. The CPS data used 
here does not include information about earnings over $1,099,999 in any given job, 
and some earnings below that threshold are suppressed in the public use file in order 
to preserve confidentiality.  
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This paper will focus on the bottom 50 percent of the income distribution (the 
bottom 10 ventiles). The CPS does a much better job at capturing the private income 
of that group compared to the top 5 percent. Figure 3.2 shows the level and 
composition of post-tax post-transfer income for the bottom 10 ventiles of children. 
The blue area here indicates the average amount of private income after taxes, but 
before the EITC and CTC are taken into account. The remaining colors indicate the 
mean amount of income received through different government programs. For 
example, the light blue areas show the mean amount of EITC and CTC benefits 
received by the families of these children.  
 
Figure 3.2: Mean Post-Tax Post-Transfer Income of Ventiles of Children in 2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
The first take-away of Figure 3.2 is that the safety net does a lot to increase 
the income of children at the bottom of the family earnings distribution. Without the 
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safety net, the bottom 5 percent of children would have access to zero income. The 
safety net also increases the income of children in the next couple of ventiles by a 
large amount, but most safety net benefits are phased-out by the ninth (40-45%) 
ventile.  
The second take-away is that safety net is designed so that the more a family 
earns, the more their total income rises. The upward slope for total income in Figure 
3.2 shows how much total income increases as one moves from the ventiles with the 
lowest family earnings to the ventiles with higher earnings. If you want to increase 
the economic well-being of your children, it pays to work more and earn more.  
The color coding in Figure 3.2 allows us to see how different programs phase-
in and phase-out at different earnings levels. For example, the EITC (light blue) peaks 
around the fourth (15-20%) and fifth (20-25%) ventiles and phases out after that. 
SNAP (orange) helps a lot of children in families with zero earnings but also provides 
a pretty large work-support to families further up the earnings distribution.  
Figure 3.3 shows the same data as Figure 3.2 but removes private income. 
This allows one to more clearly see how different safety net programs phase out and 




Figure 3.3: Mean Safety Net Benefits for Ventiles of Children in 2012 
  
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
3.4.2 How Has the Safety Net Changed Between 1993 and 2012? 
 The expansion of tax credits for working families and the 1996 welfare reform 
law have made the safety net look much different in 2012 compared to 1993. Figure 




Figure 3.4: Mean Safety Net Benefits for Ventiles of Children in 1993 and 2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
  
 The decline of AFDC/TANF and the increase of the EITC and CTC is quite 
striking. It’s also remarkable how SNAP has become a much bigger support for both 
families at the bottom and families with higher earnings. The fact that the 2012 graph 
has more of a rounded belly shape compared to the 1993 graph is a visual 
representation of how the safety net has become more “work focused” and therefore 
provides more benefits to working families. A higher reliance on Social Security for 
the bottom ventiles is likely due to more children living with grandparents or other 
adults receiving Social Security benefits as opposed to an expansion of Social 
Security benefits for children.  
Between 1993 and 2012 the mean post-tax post-transfer income of all child 
ventiles increased, except for the bottom ventile. Figure 3.4 shows changes in income 
between 1993 and 2012 for all ventiles. The post-tax post-transfer income changes 
(grey bars) are the sum of changes in pre-government income (blue bars) and changes 
in the net impact of government taxes and benefits (orange bars).  
101 
 
Figure 3.5: Change in the Mean Income of Child Ventiles, 1993-2012
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Between 1993 and 2012 the bottom ventile saw no change in pre-government 
income, therefore the drop in post-tax post-transfer income was driven entirely by 
changes in the net impact of government taxes and benefits. In the case of the second 
ventile (5%-10% of the distribution), the increase in pre-government income of 
$2,700 was offset by a decline in the net impact of government taxes and benefits of 
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$1,000, which resulted in a $1,700 increase in post-tax post-transfer income. Given 
that safety net benefits generally phase-out as earnings increase, that decline in safety 
net benefits could be both due to the increases in earnings of that ventile and due to 
changes in the benefit levels of safety net programs. A more direct way to observe 
how safety net programs have changed is to compare children with similar levels of 
family private income across years. Figure 3.6 does this for children with family 
private income up to $70,000 per year.    
Figure 3.6: Mean Safety Net Benefits for Children in 1993 and 2012 by family 
private income groups 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four.  
 
 The similarity between Figure 3.6 and 3.4 provides evidence that the 
differences observed between 1993 and 2012 are largely due to changes in the benefit 
structure and availability of safety net benefits as opposed to changes in the mean 
private income of ventiles. To get a clearer picture of how the net impact of taxes and 
benefits have changed for families at different points in the earnings distribution one 
can subtract the total amount of government assistance in 2012 from the total amount 
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of government assistance in 1993 for each family earnings group. Those differences 
are presented in Figure 3.7.  
Figure 3.7: Change in the impact of taxes and benefits by family private income 
group, 1993 to 2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four.  
 
 For children in families with zero private income, taxes and transfers provided 
$1,500 less in support in 2012 than in 1993. In contrast, figure 3.7 shows how the 
taxes and transfers system provided more support for all families with $2,000-
$70,000 in pre-government income in 2012 than in 1993. Children in families with 
pre-government income between $18,000-$30,000 saw the biggest boost, but even 
children in families with pre-government income between $50,000 and $70,000 had 
an increase in the impact of government taxes and assistance of over $4,000.  
 Figure 3.8 shows what income sources drove the changes of the impact of the 
tax and benefits system for families with children at different points in the private 
income distribution.  
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Figure 3.8: Change in the Impact of Safety Net by Income Source, 1993 to 2012  
 




For families at the bottom of the earnings distribution, the decline in 
AFDC/TANF drove down the impact of government benefits and taxes. Families 
have mitigated that loss by relying more on Social Security and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI). The increase in Social Security income suggests that these 
families responded to the decline in other income sources by doubling up with a 
family member who receives Social Security such as a grandparent.  
For families higher in the pre-government income distribution, the increase of 
the EITC and CTC drove the boost in the positive impact of taxes and transfers. The 
SNAP program also provided much more support for families with earnings in 2012 
than in 1993.  
 The boost in the net impact of government transfers and taxes for families 
with children with $50,000 in pre-government income was driven by the CTC and 
other changes in tax policy such as tax rate and marriage penalty reductions. (See the 
$2,022 increase of the impact of the CTC and the $1,820 increase in the impact of 







3.4.3 How Has the Level and Composition of Income Changed for Different 
Ventiles Between 1993 and 2012?  
Changes in the tax and transfer system have impacted the mean post-tax and 
post-transfer incomes of families with children. Between 1993 and 2012, the post-tax 
and post-transfer income of the bottom ventile of children in the private family 
income distribution dropped by 9 percent or $1,600 dollars. Most of that decline 
occurred between 1995 and 2001 when post-tax post-transfer income dropped by 23 
percent or $4,400.  
The mean post-tax post-transfer income of the second ventile (children with 
family pre-government income between 5-10% of the distribution) increased by 9 
percent between 1993 and 2012. The total income of the next three ventiles increased 
by 32-35 percent. See figure 3.9.  
Figure 3.9: Percent Change Since 1993 in Post-Tax Post-Transfer Income of 
Ventiles of Children  
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
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 Figure 3.10 explains why the mean post-tax post-transfer income of the 
bottom ventile fell. Between 1995 and 2005 the post-tax post-transfer income of the 
bottom ventile of children dropped by 16 percent or $3,100. Comparing 1995 to 2005 
provides an especially revealing look because 1995 was the year before the enactment 
of the 1996 welfare law while 2005 was a year with comparable economic conditions. 
The percent of adults employed stood at 62.7 percent in 2005 compared to 62.9 
percent in 1995. The unemployment rate in 2005 (5.1 percent) was similar to the rate 
in 1995 (5.6 percent).  
The drop in post-tax post-transfer income of the bottom ventile was driven by 
a decline in AFDC/TANF income. The mean amount of AFDC/TANF assistance 
received by the bottom ventile of children dropped by 62 percent ($4,200) from 1995 
to 2005. Some families responded to this drop by moving in with a family member 
who received Social Security. In 1995, 20 percent of children in the bottom ventile 
lived with a family member who received Social Security compared to 24 percent in 
2005. That contributed to a 46 percent ($1,100) increase in Social Security benefits 
received by the bottom ventile of children.  
The average amount of SNAP assistance received by the bottom ventile of 
children increased from 2007 to 2010 by 45 percent ($1,800). This was partly due to 
an increase in the participation rate of eligible families and a temporary increase in 
monthly SNAP benefits included in the 2009 Recovery Act. This was one of various 
measures enacted to support the struggling economy during the Great Recession. The 




Figure 3.10: Composition of Income of Bottom Ventile of Children, 1993-2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the post-tax post-transfer income trends of the 2nd ventile. 
Those are children with private family income between 5 and 10 percent of the 
distribution. The total income of children in this ventile stayed flat during the 
economic boom of 1995 because the increase in family earnings and the EITC were 




Figure 3.11: Composition of Income of 2nd Ventile (5-10%) of Children, 1993-
2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Figures 3.12-3.15 show mean income trends for the 3rd, 4th, and 5th ventiles of 
children. Together these figures show how as one moves up the private income 
distribution the role of TANF and SNAP decrease substantially. These families are 
the ones that saw an increase in total income during the 1990s which drove the 
decline in child poverty rates. These figures show how the rise of total income for 
these three ventiles was driven by gains in earnings, which more than made up for 
TANF and SNAP losses during that period. Expansions of the EITC and CTC also 
contributed to increasing family’s post-tax post-transfer incomes. Earnings declined 
for a few years after 2000, and declined more after the Great Recession started in 
2007. Rising SNAP income helped maintain the level of total income throughout the 
2000s and particularly during the Great Recession for these three ventiles.  
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Figure 3.12: Composition of Income of 3rd Ventile (10-15%) of Children, 1993-
2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Figure 3.13: Composition of Income of 4th Ventile (15-20%) of Children, 1993-
2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 




Figure 3.14: Composition of Income of 5th Ventile (20-25%) of Children, 1993-
2012 
 
Note: Figures are in 2012 dollars and equivalent to a family of four. Ventiles of children are created by 
ranking children by their family’s pre-government size-adjusted income. 
 
Figures 3.12-3.14 show how even after recent expansions, the CTC helps the 
5th ventile more than the 3rd and 4th ventiles. Therefore, it seems like an in increase in 
the phase-in rate of the CTC (currently at 15 percent) and starting CTC benefits at the 
first dollar of earnings instead of at $3,000 would make the CTC much more 
beneficial to children in the 3rd and 4th ventiles.  
3.4.4 Demographic and Other Characteristics of Child Ventiles in 2012 
 Instead of analyzing trends over time like previous sections, this section 
focuses on the characteristics of children in different ventiles in 2012. The graphs in 
this section show the share of children in each ventile that fit a given characteristic. 
The ventiles for these graphs were created by ranking children by their family’s post-
tax and post-transfer income. That income measure was chosen since it includes the 
impact of all government benefits and taxes and therefore provides a better measure 
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of the economic well-being of children. Previous sections ranked children by their 
family’s pre-government income in order to analyze how the safety net impacts the 
income of children at different points in the family earnings/private income 
distribution.  
 Figure 3.15 shows the mean post-tax post-transfer income of ventiles created 
by both sorting children by their family’s pre-government income and sorting 
children by their family’s post-tax and post-transfer income. The graphs separate out 
private income (after taxes, before EITC & CTC) and government assistance. Here, 
government assistance includes all the government income sources shown separately 
in previous graphs. (EITC, CTC, TANF, SNAP, school lunch, housing assistance, 
SSI, social security, unemployment insurance, and “other government.”) For most 
families, private income sources make up almost all of their total income. Therefore, 
sorting by post-tax post-transfer income doesn’t make that much difference to the 
overall picture of income distribution. However, the sorting does make a difference to 
the mean income at the very bottom of the distribution. The mean post-tax post-
transfer income of the bottom 5 percent of children drops from $16,700 to $11,300 
when sorting by post-tax post-transfer income instead of sorting by pre-government 
income. That’s because access to safety net benefits is not universal. Some families 
with little earnings get enough safety net benefits to substantially boost their income 
while some families with little earnings get very little assistance. By ranking by post-
tax post-transfer income, all those families with little earnings and little assistance get 
grouped together in a bottom ventile. Therefore, that bottom ventile ends up with 
lower mean post-tax post-transfer income than the bottom ventile that was created by 
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ranking by pre-government income. In future research, I plan to look more closely at 
which families with little earnings get assistance and which families don’t. I’d like to 
see whether this varies by state and whether this variation has increased since 1996 
due to the flexibility given to states in the 1996 welfare law. It’s important to note 
that the 1995-2005 decline in post-tax post-transfer income of the bottom 5 percent of 
children previously discussed is similar if one ranks children by their family’s pre-




Figure 3.15: Mean Post Tax & Transfer Income of Child Ventiles sorted by pre-




 Figure 3.16 shows the percent of children in each post-tax and transfer ventile 
by their race and ethnicity. White non-Hispanic children made up 32 percent of 
children in the bottom ventile, but 75 percent of children in the top ventile. Black and 
Hispanic children make up the majority of children in the bottom six ventiles, but 
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their share declines as one moves up the income distribution. Only 11 percent of 
children in the top ventile are either Hispanic or Black.  
Figure 3.16: Race Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child Ventiles, 2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
 Figure 3.17 show the share of children in different ventiles by their own and 
their parents’ citizenship status. The share of children who are citizens does not vary 
a lot by ventiles; 96 percent of children in the bottom ventile are U.S. citizens while 
98 percent of children in the top ventile are U.S. citizens. What varies more is the 
citizenship status of their parents. Over 20 percent of children in the bottom six 
ventiles are citizens themselves, but have a parent (or primary caretaker) who is a 
non-citizen. Meanwhile, on average, 8 percent of children in the top six ventiles are 






Figure 3.17: Citizenship Status Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child 
Ventiles, 2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
 A growing body of research finds that exposure to poverty in early childhood 
can impact brain development, school performance, and can have a cumulative toll on 
a person’s longer term physical and mental health9. Therefore, it seems important to 
look at the distribution of children by ventiles by their age. Figure 3.18 shows how 
children in the bottom ventile tend to be younger than children further up the income 
distribution. For example, 42 percent of children in the bottom ventile are under age 6 






                                                 




Figure 3.18: Age of Child Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child Ventiles, 
2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
A likely reason for younger children to be found in the bottom ventiles is due 
to parents working less while their children are young. To test that theory, figure 3.19 
looks at ventiles of children, but not by each child’s age, but the age of the youngest 
child in their family. Using that measure, one finds that 62 percent of children in the 
bottom ventile live in a family whose youngest child is 5 years old or younger 
compared to 48 percent in the middle two ventiles and 38 percent of children in the 
top ventile. That provides some evidence on how children might not be in the same 
ventile during their whole childhood. As they and/or their siblings get older, they’re 







Figure 3.19: Age of Youngest Child Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child 
Ventiles, 2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
 Figure 3.20 presents data on family composition. Approximately 70 percent of 
children in the bottom ventile live in a single female headed family. The percent of 
children who live in a single female headed family drops as one moves up the income 
distribution. Only 6 percent of children in the top ventile live in a single female 
headed family. About 9 percent of children in the bottom half of the income 
distribution live in a single male headed family. That percentage also declines as one 
moves further up the income distribution. For this chapter I used the official poverty 
family unit which groups together those related by marriage, birth or adoption. In 
future research, I would like to analyze how this graph and other findings in this 




Figure 3.20: Family Type Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child Ventiles, 
2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
Figure 3.21 shows the share of children in each ventile by their parent’s 
educational attainment. If a child lives with both parents, then the educational 
attainment of the parent with the most education is used for these calculations. The 
bottom ventile is about equally split into thirds. A third of children live with parents 
whose highest educational attainment is less than high school, a third have parents 
with just a high school degree, and another third have a parent with at least some 
college education. The share of children who have a parent (or primary caretaker) 








Figure 3.21: Education of Parent Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child 
Ventiles, 2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
Figure 3.22 shows the share of children in each ventile by what region of the 
country they live10. The South and Northeast provide contrasting stories in terms of 
the distribution of children by ventiles. Almost half (47 percent) of children in the 
bottom ventile live in the South compared to 31 percent of children in the top ventile. 
Meanwhile, 12 percent of children in the bottom ventile live in the Northeast 
compared to 23 percent of children in the top ventile. Some factors that could be 
                                                 
10 States are grouped by region using the Census Bureau's definition of regions. The Northeast Census 
region consists of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. The Midwest region is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin. 
The South region is defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The West region is defined as Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. 
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driving those differences could be differences in the availability of jobs, wage levels, 
and safety net benefits between those two regions.  
The share of children who live in the Midwest is fairly constant across 
ventiles going from 20 percent in the bottom ventile to 18 percent in the top ventile. 
The West has a higher proportion of children in the top ventile (28 percent) than in 
the bottom ventile (21 percent), but a more constant distribution across some of the 
intermediate ventiles. For example, 26 percent of children in the 4th, 8th, 11th, 18th, and 
19th ventiles live in the West. All these figures by region would likely be different if 
some sort of geographic adjustment was done to take into account differences across 
regions in living costs such as housing.  
Figure 3.22: Region Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child Ventiles, 2012 
 




 The CPS data also provides information on whether someone lives in an 
urban, rural or suburban setting. Due to privacy reasons, the location for some 
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households are not identified. Figure 3.23 shows the share of children in each ventile 
by where they live. Almost a fifth (19 percent) of children in the bottom ventile live 
in a rural area compared to only 4 percent of children in the top ventile. The 
proportion of children in urban areas is highest in the 2nd ventile (38 percent) and that 
percentage mostly declines as one moves up to higher income ventiles, except for the 
top ventile.   
 
Figure 3.23: Rural vs Urban vs Suburbs Composition of Post Tax & Transfer 
Child Ventiles, 2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
 Figure 3.24 shows the composition of child ventiles by the labor status of their 
family members. Given their very low pre-government income, it’s not surprising that 
71 percent of children in the bottom ventile live in a family where no one worked 
during the year.  
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The CPS asks respondents for the reason for not having worked during the 
year. Out of the parents who did not work in 2012, 57 percent reported taking care of 
home or family, 19 percent reported being ill or disabled, 11 percent reported not 
being able to find a job and 8 percent reported going to school.   
 
Figure 3.24: Work Status Composition of Post Tax & Transfer Child Ventiles, 
2012 
 
Ventiles of children are created by ranking children by their family’s post-taxes post-transfers size-
adjusted income. 
 
Some of the characteristics already discussed also provide some evidence to 
why so many parents in the bottom ventile did not work in 2012. A lot of them are 
single mothers with young children and therefore the lack of affordable and safe child 
care could be a barrier to full-time work. Many of these single mothers will work 
once their kids are older. The employment rate for single mothers with a child 
younger than 3 was 65 percent in 2012 compared to 80 percent for single mothers 
with a youngest child who is at least 10 years old. Most children in the bottom ventile 
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have parents who don’t have more than a high school education which adds to the 
difficulty of finding work. Nationwide, in 2012, the employment rate for 25-54 year 
olds with a high school degree or less was 72 percent compared to 85 percent for 
those with at least some college education. Differences in the labor market across the 
country could also play a role. As figures 3.22 and 3.23 showed, children in the 
bottom ventiles are more likely to live in the South and in rural areas compared to 
children further up the income distribution. When more recent data becomes 
available, it will be interesting to see what this graph would look like in 2016 when 
the national unemployment rate fell below 5 percent. In 2012, the labor market was 
still recovering from the Great Recession and monthly national unemployment rates 
averaged 8.1 percent.  
 Nevertheless, starting with the 2nd ventile, a majority of children in 2012 lived 
in a family with at least one worker. In the 3rd ventile, 60 percent of children lived in 
a family with someone who worked at least half-time (1,000 hours during the year.). 
In the 4th ventile, 51 percent of children live in a family with someone who worked 
full-time full year. The mean post-tax post-transfer income (equivalent to a family of 
four) for these three ventiles are $20,500 $25,800 and $30,100 respectively. Given 
that a majority of children in these three ventiles lived in a family where someone 
worked, the path for these families towards higher incomes seems to be one of not 
only additional hours worked, but one of higher paying jobs. This is further 
demonstrated by figure 3.25 which shows the composition of child ventiles by the 
pre-tax hourly wage of their family member with the highest hourly wage. More than 
two-thirds of children in the third and fourth ventiles (10-20 percent of the income 
125 
 
distribution) lived in a family whose highest hourly wage worker earns less than $12 
per hour.  
Figure 3.25: Maximum Hourly Wage of Family Member Composition of Post 




The safety net does a lot to support the income of children at various points of 
the family earnings distribution. In 2012, it provided $16,700 to children in the 
bottom 5 percent of the family earnings distribution and $14,000 to children in the 
fourth ventile (15-20% of the distribution). Nonetheless, for children in the poorest 
families, this support became weaker in the decade after 1995. For children in 
families with zero private income, taxes and transfers provided $1,500 less in support 
in 2012 than in 1993. In contrast, the taxes and transfers system provided $7,100 
more in support for families earning $26,000 and provided $4,500 more in support for 
families earning $50,000. These trends were driven by the decline of cash assistance 
after the 1996 welfare law, the expansions of the EITC and CTC, and by SNAP 
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becoming a much more important income support for working families. During the 
Great Recession additional SNAP, EITC, and CTC income helped maintain the 
income level of families with children even though earnings were declining due to the 
weakness in the economy.  
Changes in the tax and transfer system have impacted the mean post-tax and 
post-transfer incomes of families with children. Between 1993 and 2012 the mean 
post-tax post-transfer income of all child ventiles increased, except for the bottom 
ventile. This paper demonstrated how important it is to look at ventiles instead of 
quintiles of children because of how different trends can be for the four ventiles of 
children within the bottom quintile. The post-tax and post-transfer income of the 
bottom ventile of children in the private family income distribution dropped by 9 
percent between 1993 and 2012. The mean post-tax post-transfer income of the 
second ventile (5-10% of the distribution) increased by 9 percent between 1993 and 
2012. The post-tax post-transfer income of the next two ventiles (10-20% of the 
distribution) increased by 34-35 percent.  
The mean post-tax post-transfer income of the bottom ventile fell because of 
the reduction in cash assistance that followed the passing of the 1996 welfare law. 
Between 1995 and 2005 the post-tax post-transfer income of the bottom ventile of 
children dropped by 16 percent or $3,100. Comparing 1995 to 2005 provides an 
especially revealing look because 1995 was the year before the enactment of the 1996 
welfare law while 2005 was a year with comparable economic conditions. The drop 
in post-tax post-transfer income of the bottom ventile was driven by a decline in 
AFDC/TANF income. The mean amount of AFDC/TANF assistance received by the 
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bottom ventile of children dropped by 62 percent ($4,200) from 1995 to 2005. This 
finding is important for understanding the impact of the 1996 welfare law and 
informing policy debates about the future of the safety net. Some policy makers are 
proposing TANF-like reforms to the SNAP program. If those reforms have the same 
impact of reducing access to assistance, then the income of the bottom 5 percent of 
children could further decline.  
The analysis of the characteristics of children and their families in different 
ventiles provides some clues to the challenges faced by these families. Children in the 
bottom ventiles are more likely to live in a single mother family and have siblings 
who are two years old or younger. They are also more likely to live in a family where 
no one has a postsecondary education. Children in the bottom ventiles are more likely 
to live in the South and live in a rural area. They are also more likely to live in a 
family where no one works or someone works for less than $8 per hour. The fact that 
Hispanic and Black children make up 59 percent of children in the bottom ventile, but 
11 percent of children in the top ventile shows that the United States is still far from 
providing equality of opportunity for children regardless of their race and ethnicity. 
Public policies need to focus on supporting these families so that these children can 
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